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BIG DATA BLACKLISTING  
Margaret Hu 
Abstract 
“Big data blacklisting” is the process of categorizing individuals as 
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of suspicious 
digital data and database screening results. Database screening and digital 
watchlisting systems are increasingly used to determine who can work, 
vote, fly, etc. In a big data world, through the deployment of these big 
data tools, both substantive and procedural due process protections may 
be threatened in new and nearly invisible ways. Substantive due process 
rights safeguard fundamental liberty interests. Procedural due process 
rights prevent arbitrary deprivations by the government of 
constitutionally protected interests. This Article frames the increasing 
digital mediation of rights and privileges through government-led big 
data programs as a constitutional harm under substantive due process, and 
identifies the obstruction of core liberties with big data tools as rapidly 
evolving and systemic.  
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To illustrate the mass scale and unprecedented nature of the big data 
blacklisting phenomenon, this Article undertakes a significant descriptive 
burden to introduce and contextualize big data blacklisting programs. 
Through this descriptive effort, this Article explores how a commonality 
of big data harms may be associated with nonclassified big data 
programs, such as the No Work List and No Vote List—programs that 
the government uses to establish or deny an individual’s eligibility for 
certain benefits or rights through database screening. The big data 
blacklisting harms of big data tools to make eligibility decisions are not, 
of course, limited to nonclassified programs. This Article also suggests 
how the same consequences may be at play with classified and semi-
classified big data programs such as the Terrorist Watchlist and No Fly 
List. This Article concludes that big data blacklisting harms interfere with 
and obstruct fundamental liberty interests in a way that now necessitates 
an evolution of the existing due process jurisprudence. 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1737 
 
 I. OVERVIEW OF THE BIG DATA BLACKLISTING 
  INQUIRY ................................................................................ 1745 
  A. What Is Big Data Blacklisting?  ................................... 1747 
  B. Big Data Blacklisting and Due Process Liberty  
   Interests ........................................................................ 1752 
 
 II. DATABASE SCREENING AND DIGITAL  
  WATCHLISTING SYSTEMS ..................................................... 1761 
  A. Nonclassified Big Data Programs ................................ 1762 
   1. No Work List ......................................................... 1763 
   2. No Vote List .......................................................... 1767 
   3. No Citizenship List ............................................... 1770 
  B. Classified and Semi-Classified Big  
   Data Programs ............................................................. 1773 
   1. Terrorist Watchlist ................................................ 1773 
   2. No Fly List ............................................................ 1775 
  C. Commonality of Big Data Consequences ..................... 1776 
 
 III. BIG DATA BLACKLISTING RISKS .......................................... 1777 
  A. Risks of Nonclassified Big Data Programs .................. 1777 
   1. No Work List ......................................................... 1778 
   2. No Vote List .......................................................... 1783 





Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/5
2015] BIG DATA BLACKLISTING 1737 
 
  B. Risks of Classified and Semi-Classified Big Data  
   Programs ...................................................................... 1786 
  1. Terrorist Watchlist ................................................ 1786 
  2. No Fly List ............................................................ 1788 
 
 IV. BIG DATA BLACKLISTING AND THE DUE  
  PROCESS INQUIRY ................................................................. 1792 
  A. Substantive Due Process and Informational  
   Privacy Rights .............................................................. 1794 
  B. Substantive Due Process Approach to  
   Systemic Big Data Blacklisting Harms ........................ 1797 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1798 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses an emerging constitutional harm in the digital 
age: the mass “blacklisting”1 of individuals through the development and 
adoption of governance tools that rely upon the technologies of big data.2 
                                                                                                                     
 1. The term “blacklist” is defined as “a list of persons or organizations under suspicion, or 
considered untrustworthy, disloyal, etc, [especially] one compiled by a government or an 
organization.” COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012). The concept of “blacklisting” is 
often associated with 1950s-era McCarthyism. See, e.g., ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF 
MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 92–93 (1994) (explaining that McCarthy-era 
blacklisting consequences were often economic in nature, leading to unemployment; yet, “[t]he 
blacklist took a personal toll as well. Broken health and broken marriages, even suicides were not 
unknown.”). Several scholars and experts have analogized the blacklisting practices of the prior 
historic era with contemporary terrorism prevention practices. See, e.g., JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. 
SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS 8 (2013) (comparing U.S. 
passport and travel restrictions during the McCarthy era with the No Fly List restrictions after 
9/11, and concluding that “[t]he mistakes of the mid-twentieth century are being remade at the 
start of the twenty-first century”); David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating 
Preventive Justice, 9 CRIM. LAW & PHIL. 501 (2015) (discussing legal rules that remain in effect 
that “reflect lessons learned from the McCarthy era, in which thousands of innocent citizens were 
caught up in the preventive frenzy of anti-communism”) (citing Geoffrey Stone, PERILOUS TIMES: 
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 311–426 
(2004)); Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1205–06 
(describing the No Fly List and other government efforts to target suspicious individuals or 
suspicious behaviors as contemporary “government blacklists” and “blacklisting” programs); 
Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 65, 68 (2006) (“It is, therefore, time to ask if something equivalent to the blacklists of 
fifty years ago is happening again, and, if so, how the twenty-first century use of watch lists [in 
the post-9/11 counter-terrorism context] might or might not resemble the blacklisting of the 
McCarthy era.”).  
 2. “Big data” is difficult to define, as it is a newly evolving field and the technologies that 
it encompasses are evolving rapidly as well. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & 
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND 
3
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Specifically, “big data blacklisting”3 describes the harm incurred by those 
categorized by the government as administratively “guilty until proven 
innocent” by virtue of digitally generated suspicion, such as through 
government-led big data systems that flag suspicious digital data and 
database screening results.4 Those who may be digitally blacklisted 
include anyone with a digital trail or a presence within a database. 
Big data blacklisting harms result from the mediation of and 
interference with fundamental liberty interests. Additionally, as this 
Article illustrates, those tracked and isolated for action by government-
led big data blacklisting programs often have limited to nonexistent 
options to remediate or may face consequences without any knowledge 
of the big data blacklisting program that impacts them.5 People in this 
                                                                                                                     
THINK (2013). Thus, some experts have explained that “‘Big Data’ is a generalized, imprecise 
term that refers to the use of large data sets in data science and predictive analytics.” Kate 
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014). “Technologists often use the technical 
‘3-V’ definition of big data as ‘high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets 
that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and 
decision making.’” Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 393, 394 (2014) (quoting IT Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/it-
glossary/big-data/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015)); see id. (citing Doug Laney, 3D Data Management: 
Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety, GARTNER (Feb. 6, 2001), http://blogs.gartner. 
com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity 
-and-Variety.pdf). Multiple authors have addressed the characteristics of “big data” and the 
challenges posed by big data technologies. See infra Part I.A.  
 3. The use of the term “blacklisting” in the media to describe the consequences of digital 
watchlisting appears to demonstrate a wider public acknowledgement of and public discourse on 
the potential consequences of such watchlisting. See, e.g., Meghan Keneally, Secret Blacklist 
Stopping Muslim Residents from Becoming Citizen, Lawsuit Claims, ABC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014, 
6:08 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/secret-blacklist-stopping-muslim-residents-citizens-
lawsuit-claims/story?id=24910447; Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret 
Government Rulebook for Labeling You a Terrorist, INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 2:45 PM), 
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/23/blacklisted/; Gail Sullivan, Why the No-Fly List Was 
Declared Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/25/judge-rules-no-fly-list-unconstitutional/ (“Imagine you’re in 
an airport en route to visit family abroad when suddenly you’re surrounded. Then you are detained 
and interrogated. You not only miss your scheduled flight, but can’t get on any other 
flight. . . . And nobody will tell you why. It’s as though you’ve been blacklisted.”).  
 4. See infra Part III.C.  
 5. Various plaintiffs have alleged in litigation that constitutional harms arise from big data 
watchlisting and dataveillance–cybersurveillance targeting systems, including database screening 
systems. Afifi v. Lynch, No. 11-0460(BAH), 2015 WL 1941420, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2015) 
(GPS tracking litigation alleging, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment violation); Latif v. Holder, 686 
F.3d 1122, 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) (No Fly List litigation by plaintiffs alleging, inter alia, due 
process violations); Complaint at 1–2, Makowski v. Holder, No. 12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 
2012) (Secure Communities (S-COMM) litigation by plaintiff alleging, inter alia, a violation of 
the Privacy Act); Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977 (D. Ariz. 
2007), aff’d sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (E-Verify 
4
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category include, most prominently, those who find themselves on a 
government digital watchlisting program or in a database screening 
system. These programs rely upon a big data approach to policy making: 
the incorporation of big data tools into programs that may include mass 
data collection,6 data mining,7 mass digital indexing,8 database screening 
protocols,9 digital watchlisting,10 big data integration,11 and predictive 
analytics.12  
                                                                                                                     
litigation by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, et al., alleging, inter alia, Fourth Amendment 
violation through search and seizure of data). 
 6. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, 
PRESERVING VALUES 5 (2014) [hereinafter PODESTA REPORT], available at https://www.white 
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“[D]ata collection 
and analysis is being conducted at a velocity that is increasingly approaching real time, which 
means there is a growing potential for big data analytics to have an immediate effect on a person’s 
surrounding environment or decisions being made about his or her life.”). 
 7. The nature of the impact of government data mining has formed the basis of extensive 
and important research in recent years. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The 
Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 437 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, 
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 321 (2008); Daniel 
J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2008). 
 8.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2002) (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the 
government can conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.”). 
 9. See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 43–59 (2000) (discussing the history of the use of data markers through computerization 
that increasingly allows for government identification of one individual against others through 
database screening of, for example, digitalized fingerprints and DNA); MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL 
DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 2–6 (2007) 
(examining constitutional implications of “knowledge discovery in databases” (KDD 
applications) through dataveillance). 
 10. See, e.g., Sharon Bradford Franklin & Sarah Holcomb, Watching the Watch Lists: 
Maintaining Security and Liberty in America, HUM. RTS., Summer 2007, at 18; KAHN, supra note 
1; WILLIAM J. KROUSE & BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33645, TERRORIST WATCHLIST 
CHECKS AND AIR PASSENGER PRESCREENING (2009); Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of 
Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 466 (2013); Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due 
Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 809–10 (2007) (“It ought to be 
viewed as intolerable in a democratic society for large numbers of innocent citizens to suffer 
stigmatic government action under a largely secret program, even if such cases can be ‘redressed’ 
through individual review.”); Steinbock, supra note 1, at 78; Susan Stellin, Who Is Watching the 
Watch Lists?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/sunday-
review/who-is-watching-the-watch-lists.html. 
 11.  Xin Luna Dong & Divesh Srivastava, Big Data Integration, 6 PROC. OF VERY LARGE 
DATA BASES [VLDB] ENDOWMENT 1188, 1189 (describing multiple technologies that assist in big 
data integration techniques, including schema mapping, record linkage, data fusion, and big data 
architecture), available at http://www.vldb.org/pvldb/vol6/p1188-srivastava.pdf.  
 12. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: 
MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS, AND METHODS 3 (2014) (explaining that tools of predictive analytics 
are not only deployed by the private and commercial sectors, but that “government and other non-
profit organizations also have reasons for wanting to know how people are going to behave and 
5
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Thus, the interrelationship between various government big data 
programs, which may on their face appear wholly unrelated, deserves 
close interrogation. Big data technologies utilized by the government can 
create a commonality of big data consequences. This Article shows how 
constitutional harms may attach to this commonality of big data 
consequences. These big data programs should be viewed collectively 
and not individually to better understand these consequences. These 
consequences often afford limited, inadequate, and impractical legal 
recourse for those impacted by big data-generated inferential guilt or by 
the type of heightened suspicion that big data technologies can facilitate, 
as well as for those who find themselves harmed by these digital 
watchlisting and database screening programs.  
It is important to note that big data blacklisting consequences are not 
limited to programs operating in the public sphere, and remedies may not 
be restricted to those available in public law.13 Yet, because this Article 
focuses on constitutional concerns, it does not attempt to address private 
big data blacklisting harms. Additionally, while critical of governmental 
big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance systems and methods, 
this Article is not a blanket rejection of big data tools. Legitimate and 
valuable uses for big data tools exist in many important contexts. 
Introducing the phenomenon of big data blacklisting and its 
consequences presents other inherent challenges. The phenomenon is 
new and technologically derived; therefore, it requires a significant 
descriptive effort to establish the contours of the phenomenon in the first 
instance. Consequently, this Article includes neither the detail of 
programmatic description nor the specificity of legal analysis that would 
be achievable if one chose to critique each program separately. A 
collective critique of the big data impact of multiple big data blacklisting 
programs is limited to a discussion as practicable within a single Article.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
then taking action to change or prevent it”); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO 
PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 59–60 (2013) (discussing predictive policing 
methods); NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT 
SOME DON’T 417–18 (2012) (discussing governmental efforts to isolate relevant signals in 
correcting the failed attempts to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11: “In cases like these, what 
matters is not our signal detection capabilities . . . . We need signal analysis capabilities to isolate 
the pertinent signals from the echo chamber.”). 
 13. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 101–03 (2015) (describing 
private credit scoring regimes and computerization of the finance sector); Danielle Keats Citron 
& Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (2014) [hereinafter Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society] (discussing algorithmic 
and scoring systems implemented by various individuals or companies that use data to make 
decisions on characterizing a person in numerous aspects of society). 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/5
2015] BIG DATA BLACKLISTING 1741 
 
Moreover, analyzing these programs—many of which are classified 
or semi-classified14 and may rely upon largely undisclosed policies and 
big data technologies, such as undisclosed algorithms—entails an 
unavoidable degree of speculation. But understanding big data 
blacklisting as a liberty-depriving constitutional harm necessitates a 
collective critique of multiple programs. As a result, this Article 
undertakes a significant descriptive burden to provide the necessary 
backdrop to begin conceptualizing a legal framework capable of 
remediating big data blacklisting consequences. Within that framework, 
this Article proposes that a substantive due process analysis is more 
appropriate than a procedural due process analysis, which may appear to 
be the most obvious remedial method.  
This Article simply poses the question of whether freedom from big 
data blacklisting harms should be a cognizable fundamental liberty 
interest. If courts recognized such an interest, then the focus of the 
constitutional inquiry becomes whether big data blacklisting has 
occurred. With this as the leading question, the issue of whether big data 
blacklisting results in a deprivation of an already cognizable fundamental 
liberty interest would become a secondary concern. This is because any 
secondary deprivation—such as a restriction on the right to travel—
would be ancillary to the primary deprivation. In other words, big data 
blacklisting would be, in and of itself, the primary deprivation of liberty. 
Under this theory, courts would construe big data blacklisting harms as 
an infringement upon a fundamental liberty interest through the 
obstruction, interference, and technological mediation of freedoms, 
rights, and privileges generally.15 
This Article first discusses big data blacklisting as a constitutionally 
cognizable harm. Part I of this Article explores, in an introductory 
manner, the appropriateness of both procedural and substantive due 
process as possible legal frameworks for vindicating big data blacklisting 
harms. It argues that big data blacklisting systems create an 
administrative and noncriminal “guilty until proven innocent” concern 
for the digitally blacklisted. The process of big data blacklisting and the 
digital suspicion it creates are an infringement upon a fundamental liberty 
interest.  
                                                                                                                     
 14. For the purposes of this Article, certain programs, such as the Terrorist Watchlist and 
No Fly List are referred to as classified or semi-classified. While these programs themselves are 
not technically classified, the government has explained that these programs are informed by 
classified information. “The term ‘classified information’ means information which . . . is, for 
reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for 
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” 18 U.S.C. 798(b) (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 1, at 1209 (“[C]ourts have considered many . . . claims” 
concerning “the freedom to perform desired actions . . . .”).  
7
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Additionally, this Article seeks to establish a preliminary factual 
record of a representative sample of big data blacklisting programs, their 
functionality, and observed harms and deprivations resulting from their 
use. Part II provides an overview of the mechanics and structure of 
nonclassified programs such as the No Work List (i.e., database screening 
through E-Verify to conduct work eligibility assessments),16 the No Vote 
List (i.e., database screening to conduct voter purges from voter 
registration rolls through Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements 
(SAVE),17 Help America Vote Act (HAVA),18 etc.), and the No 
                                                                                                                     
 16. E-Verify is a “pilot” program jointly operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) that enables employers to screen 
employees’ personally identifiable data (e.g., name, birthdate, and Social Security Number) 
through government databases over the Internet to “verify” the identity and employment 
eligibility of the employee. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., E-VERIFY USER MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 1 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites 
/default/files/files/nativedocuments/E-Verify_Manual.pdf. E-Verify is referred to as the “Basic 
Pilot Program” in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) and in subsequent congressional action extending its funding. Id. at 77–78; Basic Pilot 
Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, 115 Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101, 1324a (2012)); Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-156, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324a (2012)). For a thorough 
discussion of E-Verify and its legal implications, see Juliet Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody 
Cares About E-Verify (And Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381 (2012). See also 
Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 564 (2012) (discussing the 
delegation of employment verification and immigration screening to private entities, such as 
employers) (citing Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN L. 
REV. 1103, 1130 (2009); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. 
L.J. 777, 780–81 (2008)). 
 17. In recent years, state election officials have used the SAVE database screening protocol 
to conduct voter purges. See infra Subsection II.A.2; see also Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for 
Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66 (2012). For more information on the SAVE 
database screening program, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCIS/PIA-006, PRIVACY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS (SAVE) 
PROGRAM 12 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_ 
save.pdf. 
 18. See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 
1666, 1666–1730 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012)). HAVA 
requires each state to implement and maintain an electronic database of all registered voters. 42 
U.S.C. § 15483(a). HAVA also requires states to verify the identity of the voter registration 
application through cross-checking the applicant’s driver’s license or last four digits of the 
applicant’s Social Security Number. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i). If the individual does not have either 
number, the state must assign a voter identification number to the applicant. Id. 
§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(ii). Each state election office oversees election rules and procedures for that 
state in the implementation of HAVA. President Signs H.R. 3295, “Help America Vote Act of 
2002,” SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_bulletin_
110702.html [hereinafter President Signs HAVA]. Excellent research has been conducted in recent 
years on these emerging developments in election law. See, e.g., Rebecca Green, Rethinking 
Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779 (2014); Martha Kropf, North Carolina 
8
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Citizenship List (i.e., database screening to support immigration 
detention and deportation under the Prioritized Enforcement Program 
(PEP),19 the former Secure Communities (S-COMM) program,20 etc.). 
The big data blacklisting harms of digital screening tools to make 
eligibility decisions are not, however, limited to these nonclassified 
programs. This Article suggests that the same issues may be at play with 
classified and semi-classified big data programs. Next, this Article 
addresses such programs, specifically the No Fly List (i.e., database 
screening through Secure Flight and other databases for digital watchlist 
                                                                                                                     
Election Reform Ten Years After the Help America Vote Act, 12 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2013); Daniel 
P. Tokaji, HAVA in Court: A Summary and Analysis of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 203 (2013); 
Daniel P. Tokaji & Paul Gronke, The Party Line: Assessing the Help America Vote Act, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 111 (2013). 
 19. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced DHS Prioritized Enforcement Program (PEP) 
on November 20, 2014, to replace the S-COMM program; however, it appears that the database 
screening protocols of S-COMM will remain intact under PEP. See Memorandum from Jeh 
Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf. 
 20. S-COMM, now renamed PEP, see id., is an interoperability program that facilitates data 
sharing and database screening protocols between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
DHS, and local law enforcement agencies. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
Important scholarship has addressed multiple legal issues relating to S-COMM in recent years. 
See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 79–83 (2014) (discussing the 
negative consequences of state and local information gathering in the face of S-COMM); Thomas 
J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure 
Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014) (arguing that S-COMM had a limited impact on the 
reduction of crime); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
87, 110–34 (2013) (discussing the impact of S-COMM as including potential interference with 
local crime control efforts and facilitating a potential “disparate impact” on specific 
communities); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 209–16 (2013) 
(describing the effect of S-COMM as “immigration rendition” and calling into question the 
legality of immigration detainers under S-COMM). DHS explains that S-COMM is justified by a 
combination of authorities. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal 
Advisor, to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf. DHS relied upon the following: (1) that 
28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) together provide the FBI with authority to share 
fingerprint data with ICE/DHS; (2) that 8 U.S.C. § 1722 mandates the development of a data 
sharing system that “enable(s) intelligence and law enforcement agencies to determine the 
inadmissibility or deportability of an [undocumented immigrant]”; and (3) that 42 U.S.C. § 14616 
ratifies information or database sharing between federal and state agencies. Id. at 4–6. 
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nomination)21 and the Terrorist Watchlist (i.e., database screening 
through the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)).22  
Part III focuses on how each program screens the general public and 
subpopulations through big data protocols and, in the process, creates its 
own class of big data blacklisted individuals. Specifically, it explains 
how, for example, matches and mismatches in big data systems can lead 
to inferential guilt that can directly or indirectly categorize individuals as 
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of digitally 
generated suspicion. The risk of mass, erroneously heightened suspicion 
that is now facilitated by big data tools places fundamental liberty 
interests at risk as well.  
Part IV contends that substantive due process rights were forged in a 
small data world.23 It is now necessary, therefore, to revise the substantive 
due process inquiry in light of big data challenges and constitutional 
threats. This Article concludes that the lack of procedural and substantive 
due process protections in place to safeguard those wrongly facing digital 
blacklisting and the mass scale of the problem will likely place 




                                                                                                                     
 21. For an excellent discussion on the No Fly List, including a careful examination of both 
the constitutional and human impact, see KAHN, supra note 1. Jeffrey Kahn carefully lays out the 
history and programmatic structure of the No Fly List. Id. at 137–53; see also Vision 100—
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2568 (2003) 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2012)); Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018, 
64,019 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540, 1544, 1560); Press Release, Transp. & 
Sec. Admin., TSA to Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System (Aug. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/08/26/tsa-test-new-passenger-pre-screening-system 
(describing the implementation of a post-9/11 passenger prescreening program that checks 
passengers’ names against terrorist watchlists to improve the use of “no fly” lists). The Computer 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) relies upon the Passenger Name Record 
database (PNR), checks the passenger’s data against the Transportation Security Administration’s 
(TSA) “No-Fly” list and the FBI’s lists, and assigns a terrorist “risk score” through statistical 
algorithms. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., CAPPS II: Myths and Facts (Feb. 
13, 2004), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=478534. 
 22. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) is “often referred to as the ‘Terrorist 
Watchlist.’” About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screening-
center. 
 23. “‘Small data,’ like ‘big data,’ has no set definition.” Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big 
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329 n.6 (2015). Generally, 
small data can be described as “solving discrete questions with limited and structured data, and 
the data are generally controlled by one institution.” Id. (citing JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIG DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION 1–2 (2013)).  
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I.  OVERVIEW OF THE BIG DATA BLACKLISTING INQUIRY 
Before individuals are allowed to fly,24 work,25 drive,26 or vote,27 
citizens and noncitizens alike may now be subjected to mass data 
collection and automated or semi-automated database screening 
protocols.28 Increasingly, in the name of national security and homeland 
security, post-9/11 big data programs implemented by the government 
partially obstruct core rights and freedoms in some instances and 
altogether block them in others.29 Moreover, because of the virtual nature 
of mass data collection and database screening, and the classified or semi-
                                                                                                                     
 24. See infra Subsections II.B.2 and III.B.2. 
 25. See infra Subsections II.A.1 and III.A.1. 
 26. Prior to issuing driver’s licenses, many states now screen individuals through SAVE, a 
database screening program operated by DHS. See, e.g., Applying for a Driver’s License or State 
Identification Card, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 2, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ 
sevis/pdf/dmv_factsheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 5, 2012) (“Most states and territories use the 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program to determine a non-citizen’s 
eligibility for many public benefits, including the issuance of a driver’s license.”).  
 27. See infra Subsections II.A.2 and III.A.2 
 28. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1260 (2007) (“Automated decision systems have been characterized as rules-based programs, 
data-matching programs, or data-mining programs. . . . [For example,] data-matching systems 
compare two or more databases with an algorithmic set of rules that determine the likelihood that 
two sets of personal identifying information represent the same individual.” (citing Daniel J. 
Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005)); Citron 
& Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13, at 4 (“Automated systems are claimed to rate all 
individuals in the same way . . . . [However, b]ecause human beings program predictive 
algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the 
source code and predictive algorithms. Scoring systems mine datasets containing inaccurate and 
biased information provided by people.”) (footnote omitted); Michael Rich, Machine Learning, 
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(describing “Automated Suspicion Algorithms” as “machine learning processes [that] seek to 
predict individual criminality”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2593795. 
 29. Journalist and attorney Glenn Greenwald, and journalist and documentary filmmaker 
Laura Poitras—who reportedly exercise sole possession over the full Snowden files—and other 
surveillance experts have shared the view that the Snowden disclosures profoundly implicate 
questions of democratic governance. GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD 
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 6 (2014) (“Will the digital age . . . bring 
about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control [?]”); Peter Maass, The Intercept’s Laura 
Poitras Wins Academy Award for ‘Citizenfour’, INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2014), available at https:// 
firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/22/poitras-wins-oscar-for-citizenfour/ (“‘The disclosures that 
Edward Snowden revealed don’t only expose a threat to our privacy but to our democracy itself,’ 
Poitras said in her acceptance speech [at the 87th Academy Awards, immediately after Poitras 
received the Oscar for Best Documentary Feature for directing Citizenfour].”); RACHEL 
LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH 
AMERICANS’ DATA 9 (2013) (“The collection and retention of non-criminal information about 
Americans for law enforcement and national security purposes poses profound challenges to our 
democracy and our liberties.”).  
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classified nature of certain programs, the digital mediation of and 
potential interference with liberty interests can occur without the 
individual’s knowledge or consent.30  
Many emerging big data cybersurveillance31 and dataveillance32 
systems have not been fully interrogated. Yet, these big data systems are 
rapidly proliferating as a post-9/11 policy prescription to assess and 
prevent potential criminal and terroristic threats.33 The implications of 
government-led big data screening programs are especially critical in 
how they impact those subjected to specific administrative and 
investigatory actions as a result of the digital screening protocol and data 
analysis. But these implications are not meaningful in the abstract. To 
demonstrate this phenomenon and the associated harms, this Article 
describes the mechanics and consequences of multiple big data 
cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance programs that purportedly 
serve homeland security and national security objectives. First, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 30.  See, e.g., PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
NSA-AFFAIR (Russell A. Miller ed., forthcoming); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big 
Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2015); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 61 (2014); 
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max 
Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 
54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-
Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s 
Little Helpers: How Choice Point and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your 
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 595 (2004). 
 31. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 209 (2006) (describing 
cybersurveillance or “digital surveillance” as “the process by which some form of human activity 
is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he critical feature in each [case 
of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human”). 
Critically important works published in recent years have helped to illuminate the modern 
surveillance architecture. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, 
SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18 (2014); SHANE 
HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); DANA PRIEST & 
WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 
(2011); SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS (2010); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 
(2006); JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, BYE, BYE, AMERICAN SPIES: WHAT MODERN SURVEILLANCE IS, 
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming).  
 32. See, e.g., Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. 
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 498 (1988). Roger Clarke describes dataveillance as “the 
systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or 
communications of one or more persons.” Id. at 499. See also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE 
STUDIES 16 (2007) (“Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance 
[dataveillance] enables the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints 
to surveillance are reduced. Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government 
bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering such data . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, 
Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–30 (2014). 
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Part I attempts to provide background information to help contextualize 
the big data blacklisting phenomenon.  
A.  What Is Big Data Blacklisting? 
Big data blacklisting is the process of categorizing individuals as 
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of suspicious 
digital data and database screening results.34 Constitutional liberty 
interests assumed in a small data world are now threatened in ways that 
are difficult to grasp. In a small data world, governmental entities were 
often prevented from digitally mediating rights and liberties due to 
technological and resource limitations.35 Thus, freedoms generally could 
be obstructed only individually or in groups. If they were obstructed en 
mass, freedoms were often obstructed directly and physically (e.g., mass 
incarceration and mass internment). In other words, inherent governance 
and technological limitations generally rendered impracticable mass 
deprivations, including erroneous mass deprivations, on a scale of 
millions of individuals based upon digitally generated suspicion or 
heightened suspicion facilitated by big data tools. This was particularly 
so within a democratic system designed to enforce strong procedural 
protections in criminal justice matters.36  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 34. It is important to recognize that legal scholars have used the term “blacklist” in a variety 
of academic contexts. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom, 
45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 383 (2014) (describing the practice of “blacklisting” websites and filtering 
internet content by governments in the international community and in the United States, and the 
threat to free speech protections this poses); Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The 
Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National 
Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031 (2012) (discussing the risks of infringement 
of rights of doctors through the use of the National Practitioner Data Bank, a “blacklisting” 
database for medical professionals); Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property 
Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 1938-
2000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215 (2011) (describing the use of “blacklists” in the industry 
to distance itself from screenwriters with questionable political views). 
 35. See, e.g., Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of 
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2014).  
 36. Cole, supra note 1, at 506 (“In theory, the paradigm of prevention is constrained by a 
number of constitutional principles under U.S. law, including substantive and procedural due 
process, freedoms of speech and association, equal protection, and the civil-criminal divide. In 
practice, however, formal constitutional constraints have played a relatively modest role in 
restricting preventive measures.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1009 (2014) (“Given that Big Data is the aggregation of data about data, 
and that all data online is handed off to ISPs in some form or another, the foregoing principles 
have been (over) extended to place the entire Internet outside of meaningful constitutional 
protections, thereby allowing massive, suspicionless, and even prospective data gathering by 
government.”).  
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Yet, in what Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have termed the 
“National Surveillance State,”37 the procedural protections that once 
operated in traditional administrative and criminal justice matters are at 
risk.38 In the National Surveillance State that is rapidly unfolding within 
the Information Age, it is not so much physical personhood that big data 
programs threaten but, as Daniel Solove asserts, it is digital personhood 
and the “digital person” that are at risk.39 The research of big data 
scholars40 and others illuminates the disruptive and transformative nature 
of big data.  
For example, several scholars assert that big data-driven policing 
methods that are predictive in nature make irrelevant in practice the legal 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 520–
21 (2006) (defining the “National Surveillance State” as being “characterized by a significant 
increase in government investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to 
promoting domestic security and (as its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance 
using all of the devices that the digital revolution allows”). 
 38. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson explain 
that, in the National Surveillance State,  
[T]he government can create a parallel law enforcement structure that routes 
around the traditional criminal justice system with its own rules for surveillance, 
apprehension, interrogation, detention, and punishment. Because it is not subject 
to the oversight and restrictions of the criminal justice system, the government 
may be increasingly tempted to use this parallel system for more and more things. 
It [the government] may argue that the criminal justice system is outmoded and 
insufficiently flexible to deal with the types of security problems it now faces. 
However, the more that the government routes around the criminal justice 
system, the more it institutionalizes the parallel system as the method of choice.  
Id. 
 39. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004) (“It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that covers 
much of a person’s life—a life captured in records, a digital person composed in the collective 
computer networks of the world.”); see also id. at 161 (“Privacy is about degrees of accessibility. 
The threat to privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in increased access and 
aggregation, the construction of digital dossiers and the uses to which they are put.”). 
 40. See, e.g., danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations 
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 662–
79 (2012); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES xv–xvii (2014); EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE 
EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM ix–xv (2013); MAYER-
SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big 
Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63–64 (2012); Solon Barocas & 
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 3–6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899; 
Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at 775–91. 
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requirement of reasonable suspicion.41 Similarly, scholars such as Joshua 
Fairfield and Erik Luna ask whether the small data “innocence” of 
criminal defendants now must be recast as big data “digital innocence.”42 
Jack Balkin43 and other experts contend that big data and technologies of 
surveillance made possible by the Information Society have changed the 
landscape of governance tools.44 To assist in grappling with this sea 
change, Erin Murphy explains that modern technological advances have 
introduced new governmental “paradigms of restraint”—techniques of 
punishment and restraint that focus on governance through emerging 
surveillance developments that do not depend upon physical restraint and 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 23, at 331–32 (“[R]easonable suspicion—as a small data 
doctrine—may become practically irrelevant in an era of big data policing . . . . [because it] 
becomes significantly distorted when officers have access to more individualized or predictive 
information about a suspect.”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by the Numbers: Big Data and the 
Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 (2014) (questioning, for example, “whether 
predictive software based on historical crime data is similar to other uses of third party information 
that have already been held to support a reasonable suspicion determination”); Rich, supra note 
28, at 5 (explaining that, until the introduction of machine learning technologies, “determining 
the existence of individualized suspicion—determining whether the historical facts give rise to 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion—has remained the sole province of human actors”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 42. Fairfield & Luna, supra note 36, at 988–91 (2014) (“The growth of data collection, 
connection, and parsing capabilities could transform Big Data technologies into an important tool 
for establishing innocence . . . . [However,] data science and Big Data technologies have been 
overwhelmingly used to convict.”) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, 179–80 (2009)). 
Brandon Garrett argues that, in the criminal procedure context, “[a]s big data “becomes 
increasingly relevant to criminal cases . . . rules capable of handling complex and Big Data 
discovery should be developed.” Brandon L. Garrett, Big Data and Due Process, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. ONLINE 207, 208 (2014). 
 43. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 37, at 12; Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech 
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297 (2014) (“The digital era is different. Governments can 
target for control or surveillance many different aspects of the digital infrastructure that people 
use to communicate: telecommunications and broadband companies, web hosting services, 
domain name registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems, and 
advertisers.”). 
 44. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 32, at 16; David Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big 
Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC. 2 (2014) (“[A]s political-economic 
and socio-technological circumstances change, so surveillance also undergoes alteration, 
sometimes transformation.”); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1934, 1949 (2013) (discussing “the risks surveillance poses to democratic self-
governance . . . [including] self-censorship, in terms of speech, action, or even belief”) (internal 
citation omitted); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN 
AN ANXIOUS AGE 175–84 (2005); Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future 
of Privacy and Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 69–
82 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).  
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fall outside of the criminal law context.45 David Cole,46 Jennifer Daskal,47 
Ian Kerr,48 and other scholars assert that these new developments in 
governance methods are preventative and ex ante in nature, and precrime-
focused.49 Cole contends that surveillance is but one tool among many 
governance tools that now comprises a new “paradigm of prevention” 
that has been embraced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.50 
Gabriella Blum and Ben Wittes,51 and others have described the manner 
in which technological developments, including surveillance 
technologies, are now deployed in a way that forces a reconceptualization 
of the “social contract.”52 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329 (2008) (“A range of 
new technologies has greatly enhanced the state’s ability to monitor large numbers of individuals. 
With the advent of surveillance methods less costly than physical restraint, the standard binary of 
incarceration and liberty has unfurled into a broad continuum on which those two choices mark 
only the extremes.”). 
 46. Cole, supra note 1, at 503 (characterizing “the post-9/11 full-scale adoption of a 
paradigm of prevention” as “a sea change”). 
 47. Daskal, supra note 33, at 331 (explaining that precrime “restrictions share common 
features: they are targeted at particular individuals, entities, or categories of individuals; they 
impose noncustodial restrictions; and they are preventive in both purpose and effect”). 
 48. Ian Kerr, Prediction, Pre-emption, Presumption: The Path of Law After the 
Computational Turn, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 91–120 (Mireille Hildebrandt & 
Katja de Vries eds., 2013) (contending that predictive technologies facilitate a philosophy of pre-
emption that shifts ex post facto systems of punishment to ex ante systems of prevention in a way 
that threatens due process); see also Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, 
Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 
(2013). 
 49. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 23, at 351; Joh, supra note 41, at 56; see also Mark L. 
Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGRATION L. 
J. 45 (2015) (discussing the “deployment nationwide [of] a new automated risk assessment tool 
to help determine whether to detain or release noncitizens pending their deportation 
proceedings”). 
 50. Cole, supra note 1, at 501 (explaining that the “paradigm of prevention” includes many 
tools, including “the use of pretextual charges for preventive detention, the expansion of criminal 
liability to prohibit conduct that precedes terrorism, and expansion of surveillance at home and 
abroad”).  
 51. BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND 
GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES—CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 13–14 (2015).  
 52. Id. at 13 (discussing the “conceptual challenges that this new security environment 
poses—how it disrupts the traditional social contract described by the Enlightenment political 
theorists, how it forces us to rethink notions of privacy and the relationship between liberty and 
security within the liberal state, and how it defies the traditional allocation of powers among states 
over their territories and citizens”); SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A 
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY 251–52 (2011) 
(explaining that surveillance technologies are forcing an evolution of the social contract that 
“differs from the traditional social contract[,]” and observing that “[p]rivacy theorists and lawyers 
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Those concerned with surveillance and privacy in the digital age often 
rely upon the protective potential of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution. Scholars such as Danielle Citron and David Gray,53 Laura 
Donohue,54 Orin Kerr,55 Christopher Slobogin,56 and others57 have 
explored the capacity of the Fourth Amendment to address challenges of 
modern surveillance. Yet, the Fourth Amendment does not generally 
cover big data systems designed to execute day-to-day bureaucratized 
surveillance. In light of this, Danielle Citron explains that emerging 
technologies require an evolution of procedural due process.58 This 
evolution must include, for example, greater transparency in describing 
the underlying algorithms or automated systems that may impact rights 
and privileges.59 Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz explain that the 
predictive harms of big data systems in the private sector require a 
conceptualization of Citron’s technological due process rights when such 
harms occur.60  
                                                                                                                     
have struggled to respond to these moves, in part because of the diminishing sphere of truly private 
activity and the growing coercive powers of the state”). 
 53. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 62, 63–64 (2013); David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: 
The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 381, 390 (2013). 
 54. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone 
and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 202–19 (2015); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk 
Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
757, 863–64 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 514–29 (2012). 
 55. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 313 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–08 (2004).  
 56. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1733–42 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Making 
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic 
Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 1, 3–4 (2012).  
 57. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes.  
 58. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1281 (2007) (noting that with the 
advent of automated decisionmaking technologies and “in the automated administrative state, 
neither due process nor policymaking procedures adequately protect individuals”). 
 59. See id. at 1284 (“Access to an automated program’s source code—the programmer’s 
instructions to the computer—might provide a meaningful way for individuals to challenge an 
agency’s claims and dispel the influence of automation bias.”) (citing Christopher W. Clifton, 
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Raghu Ramakrishnan, Data Mining and Privacy: An Overview, in 
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 191, 203 
(Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006)). 
 60. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 122 (2014) (“Citron’s 
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B.  Big Data Blacklisting and Due Process Liberty Interests 
This Article attempts to extend the discussion on the intersection of 
due process and big data further by proposing another framework: the 
remediation of governmental big data blacklisting harms through a 
substantive due process approach. Big data blacklisting does not yet 
appear to be a constitutionally cognizable claim or harm under the 
existing jurisprudence. Yet, big data blacklisting itself is the harm that 
may be considered unconstitutional when grounded in due process 
through a conceptualization of what substantive due process rights can 
and should encompass, in an age when daily existence and governing 
methods both have been utterly transformed by big data technologies. 
It is arguable, in fact, that the United States is on the verge recognizing 
of such a right. In support of this argument, it is significant to note that 
several litigants61 and scholars have recently attempted to define and 
vindicate this right: to be free of the offense of inclusion on a digital 
watchlist and to be free of an obstruction of liberty interests that may 
occur through database screening and other dataveillance or 
cybersurveillance.62  
                                                                                                                     
[technological due process] approach could be expanded to address the predictive privacy harms 
of Big Data.”).  
 61. In multiple recent cases filed in federal court, plaintiffs have alleged constitutionally 
protected rights are potentially infringed upon by digital watchlisting and, therefore, seek recourse 
through the removal of their names and records from watchlists and databases. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s 
Petition for Judicial Review at 3, Naim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 1:15-cv-00842 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
28, 2015) (“Petitioner respectfully requests confirmation that his name is removed and/or cleared 
from any of the federal ‘watchlists’ that may operate to prejudice and/or impede his 
constitutionally protected liberty interests and his constitutional right to travel.”); Plaintiff’s 
Complaint at 2, Abdelfattah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 1:07-cv-01842-RCL, ¶ 6 (D.D.C. Oct. 
11, 2007) (“This suit seeks an order from this [honorable] court, to order the US government and 
its defendants [sic] agencies (ICE, CBP, CIS, FBI) to Expunge Plaintiff TECS/IBIS record located 
in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System know [sic] as (TECS II).”).  
 62. Aaron Caplan, Jennifer Daskal, Jeffrey Kahn, Peter Margulies, Peter Shane, Daniel 
Steinbock, Juliet Stumpf, Daniel Solove, and others, have proposed more robust constitutional 
protections and other legal remedies are needed in light of emerging policies and technological 
developments. Although these scholars do not frame the potential constitutional harms and 
privacy harms as big data blacklisting harms, they are also concerned with the liberty 
infringements and restrictions on freedom that are associated with digital watchlisting, database 
screening, and other bureaucratized surveillance programs. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 1, at 
1203–05 (proposing that “the constitutional immunity from bills of attainder[–]that is, the rule 
against singling out persons for punishment without trial[–]should be recognized as a due process 
liberty interest,” and specifically discussing “government blacklists” like the “No Fly List”); 
Daskal, supra note 33, at 362 (describing the impact of the No Fly List as having “a significant 
and underappreciated impact on substantive liberty interests”); Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel 
and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 276 (2008) (arguing that a fundamental liberty 
interest in the right for U.S. citizens to travel internationally should be recognized); Shane, supra 
note 10, at 810 (arguing for a “tailoring [of] the formality of post inclusion adjudication (1) to the 
18
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The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person 
shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”63 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment further 
states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”64 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments encompass both a procedural and a substantive 
component. Erwin Chemerinsky explains the distinction between 
procedural and substantive due process in the following way: 
[S]trangely enough, if you look through Supreme Court 
opinions you will never find a definition [of substantive due 
process]. Substantive due process asks the question of 
whether the government’s deprivation of a person’s life, 
liberty or property is justified by a sufficient purpose. 
Procedural due process, by contrast, asks whether the 
government has followed the proper procedures when it 
takes away life, liberty or property. Substantive due process 
looks to whether there is a sufficient substantive 
justification, a good enough reason for such a deprivation.65 
Procedural due process is the concept that when the government 
deprives a citizen of an interest in life, liberty, or property, it must give 
                                                                                                                     
nature of the different claims that may arise and (2) to the level of care exercised to protect the 
rights of individuals during determinations to list particular individuals at the “front end” of the 
process”); Steinbock, supra note 1, at 68–69 (arguing that potential reforms of the practice of 
watchlisting could include “narrowing the substantive standard for selection; adding procedural 
protection, particularly some form of adversarial process; and restricting the uses of watch list 
results”); Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16, at 406–07 (arguing for consideration of a 
potential constitutional liberty interest in preventing obstruction of employment opportunities that 
may occur through E-Verify database screening, elaborating that: “[T]he liberty interest here is 
the right not to be deprived of employment through arbitrary government action. Another way of 
articulating this is to say that deprivation of the freedom to engage in the lawful behavior of 
working requires due process of law if it is to avoid arbitrariness”); Peter Margulies, Rage Against 
the Machine?: Automated Surveillance and Human Rights 33 (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that 
“compliance with safeguards would permit tailored reconnaissance and surveillance, while 
protecting rights”) (citation omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=2657619; Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, EMORY L. J. 
(forthcoming 2016) available at http://http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=26477 
79; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 98 (2008) (“By understanding privacy 
as shaped by the norms of society, we can better see why privacy should not be understood solely 
as an individual right. . . . [P]rivacy protects the individual because of the benefits it confers on 
society.”); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 39, at 160–61 (“Public records are increasingly 
posing a serious threat to privacy in the Information Age. . . . The threat to privacy is not in isolated 
pieces of information, but in increased access and aggregation, the construction of digital dossiers 
and the uses to which they are put.”). 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 65. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999). 
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the citizen notice and an opportunity to be heard.66 Substantive due 
process, on the other hand, is not as simple. One expert explains that 
“Supreme Court decisions often give the impression that substantive due 
process jurisprudence fits into a simple two-tiered framework. Within this 
model, government intrusions on so-called ‘fundamental’ rights are 
subject to ‘strict’ or exacting scrutiny, a test sometimes formulated as 
inquiring whether a burden is necessary to promote a ‘compelling state 
interest.’”67 Substantive due process rights often appear as a protection of 
rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”68 
Rights that are not “fundamental” or “deeply rooted” are subject to lesser 
scrutiny. “All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated 
pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”69 
The fundamental liberty interests of the preexisting substantive due 
process doctrine often turn on autonomy, dignity, self-determination, and 
individual identity.70 This substantive due process jurisprudence, 
therefore, is consistent with predominant themes in the contemporary 
privacy discourse. Increasingly, scholars are examining the concept of 
the “proliferation of networked identities and selves,” which concerns the 
preservation of the autonomous self within the infrastructure of the 
Information Society.71 In addition, scholars such as Anita Allen,72 Ryan 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).  
 67. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
 68. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).  
 69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003). 
 70. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015) (“In addition these 
liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including 
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 
438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965); see also Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 574 (2003); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 71. Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While Preventing 
Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1413–14 (2014) 
(referring to the work of Professor Tal Z. Zarsky); see, e.g., JULIE COHEN, CONFIGURING THE 
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 20 (2012); Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1380–81 (2014); 
Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013); Tal Z. Zarsky, Mining 
the Networked Self, 6 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 120, 120–21 (2012). 
 72. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 66 (2008). 
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Calo,73 Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale,74 Julie Cohen,75 Michael 
Froomkin,76 Jon Mills,77 Helen Nissenbaum,78 Neil Richards,79 Paul 
Schwartz,80 Daniel Solove,81 and others82 have examined the intersection 
of privacy rights with personal and social autonomy rights. The topics of 
privacy, surveillance, and an evolving due process jurisprudence are each 
extraordinarily complex. An exhaustive, careful treatment of each goes 
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, in support of a substantive 
due process approach to big data blacklisting harms, it is worth quickly 
noting that the apparent aims of the modern substantive due process 
doctrine, and contemporary privacy and surveillance scholarship, may in 
many ways each complement the other.83 Scholars such as Mireille 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012); M. Ryan Calo, Essay, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 
IND. L.J. 1131, 1133–35 (2011); M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to 
Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 811–16 (2010). 
 74. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 16; Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra 
note 13, at 1419.  
 75. COHEN, supra note 71, at 20; Cohen, supra note 71, at 1920–21 (2013). 
 76. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1465 
(2000).  
 77. See, e.g., JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 15 (2008) (“We give up the right to 
make many decisions as part of the social contract. Being a citizen grants certain rights to 
individuals as citizens but also entails giving up certain rights to the government.”). 
 78. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–84 (2010); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as a Contextual Integrity, 
79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 125–27 (2004); Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or 
Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 635–37 (2001).  
 79. See, e.g., Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 44, at 1949. 
 80. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 
1609 (1999).  
 81. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 62, at 89–100.  
 82. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 25–26 (1967); Woodrow Hartzog & 
Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2013); Jerry 
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–20 (1998); 
Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 3 (2003) (“Every 
society sets a distinctive balance between the private sphere and the public order, based on the 
society’s political philosophy.”); David Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624281. 
 83. Increasingly, privacy scholars are framing privacy rights as public goods or collective 
goods. See, e.g., PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN, supra note 48, at 17 (in 
a section titled “Privacy and due process: a search for the public goods that inform the legal 
rights,” Katja de Vries explains that “[t]he right to due process . . . and the right to privacy . . . are 
not simply moral imperatives or philosophical concepts but fully fledged legal rights that can be 
derived from a variety of [constitutional] provisions”) (citations omitted); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, 
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 221 (1995) (arguing 
that “privacy serves not just individual interests but common, public, and collective purposes”); 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Privacy as a Public Good, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming). Under this theory, the 
protection of privacy could be conceived as similar to the protection of water and the environment. 
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Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries encourage an exploration of privacy and 
due process not “from the perspective of detailed research into positive 
law, but rather understand them as public goods that inform the legal, 
moral and political framework of constitutional democracy.”84 
Because the effect of the invisible big data revolution of governance 
is systemic, the benefit of a method of collective analysis is needed. 
Procedural due process alone will not recognize or vindicate a right to be 
free from the type of mass interference or obstruction of access to rights 
and freedoms that is possible through the government’s application of big 
data technologies. Such a right depends on a definition by which big data 
blacklisting systems, and the nature and degree of the harm that may 
result from such systems, can be sorted and assessed. A lack of 
transparency and a lack of known consequences of these systems 
complicate defining and characterizing big data blacklisting programs. 
These systems, many in their infancy, are often classified, semi-
classified, or highly bureaucratized and technologically complex. To best 
recognize big data blacklisting harms, however, it is important to note 
that big data blacklisting programs may be suspect where they implicate 
the following:  
(1) Emerging Big Data Governance Tools and Methods: 
Establishment of governmental programs and systems that support big 
data administrative decision-making processes85 dependent upon 
“unthinkably large” volumes of data86 and enormous databases87 at the 
disposal of the government to index, catalogue, and analyze individuals 
for identity and risk-based assessments;88  
                                                                                                                     
Michael Froomkin provocatively suggests that what he terms “privacy pollution” can be 
analogized to environmental pollution. A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as 
Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 1–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400736.  
 84. PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN, supra note 48, at 2. 
 85. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1252 (“The twenty-first 
century’s automated decision-making systems bring radical change to the administrative state that 
last century’s procedural structures cannot manage. In the past, computer systems helped humans 
apply rules to individual cases. Now, automated systems have become the primary decision 
makers . . . [and] often take human decision making out of the process[.]”) (citations omitted). 
 86. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 157 (“When the collection expands 
to information like financial transactions, health records, and Facebook status updates, the 
quantity being gleaned is unthinkably large.”). 
 87. Id.; see also GARFINKEL, supra note 9, at 54; KUHN, supra note 9, at 2–3; Paul Ohm, 
Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-
build-a-database-of-ruin.  
 88. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12 (“Much public and private surveillance occurs without 
any knowledge that one is watched. More to the point, data mining technologies allow the state 
and business enterprises to record perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed 
of and draw surprisingly powerful inferences about people’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes.”). 
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(2) Unprecedented Asymmetric Power: Unprecedented governmental 
access to public and private data89 leads to an unprecedented asymmetric 
power between the state and citizen,90 facilitated through big data systems 
and philosophies of governance.91 These power asymmetries are 
particularly acute when national security imperatives heighten 
governmental power92 while the administrative state objectives may 
weaken the position of the citizen in relationship to the government,93 
thus necessarily leading to a renegotiation of the “social contract”;94  
(3) Targeting Suspicious Data, Not People: Big data technologies 
facilitate the government’s ability to search for suspicious data. 
Therefore, newly emerging big data programs allow for the tracking and 
isolation of digitally generated data deemed suspicious, including 
associational data,95 correlative data, data patterns, and record location 
and algorithmically matched data, for instance. The government may use 
suspicious data and suspicious database screening results to justify a 
range of consequences suffered by the person attached to the suspicious 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (explaining that “information [is] ever 
more valuable to governments; this causes governments to invest even more heavily in the 
collection, storage, and collation of data”). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 10–11 (“Governance in the National Surveillance State is 
increasingly statistically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than focused on deterrence and 
ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing.”).  
 92. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (“Increased use of information in governance 
makes governments and those who control information flows more powerful . . . .”); see also 
Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 289, 346–47 (2015) (“Given the dominance of the security frame, even an interest in rights 
promotion may lead institutions to explain, justify, and promote rights by appealing to security.”); 
Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the 
War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1284–85 (2004) (“But our modern preoccupation with 
rights provisions may have encouraged us to overlook the possibility that structure remains a 
necessary condition for liberty. Especially in times of terror, rights provisions may become 
‘parchment barriers’ to governmental oppression. Sometimes it takes a government to check a 
government.”) (citations omitted). 
 93. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 524–25. 
 94. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 52, at 248–52 (2011) (explaining that surveillance 
technologies are forcing an evolution of the social contract that “differs from the traditional social 
contract,” and observing that “[p]rivacy theorists and lawyers have struggled to respond to these 
moves, in part because of the diminishing sphere of truly private activity and the growing coercive 
powers of the state”); see also WITTES & BLUM, supra note 51, at 13–14. 
 95. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12 (“Data mining allows inferences not only about the 
direct subjects of surveillance, but about other people with whom they live, work, and 
communicate.”) (citing Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps up 
Data, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at A1; James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data 
and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2004)); Deven Desai, 
Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 619–24 (2014).  
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digitally derived data (e.g., suspicious, Social Security Number (SSN) or 
metadata from a smartphone).96 Yet, big data-derived knowledge is 
unlike small data-derived knowledge in that it is based upon artificial 
intelligence, allowing some to compare algorithmic-driven 
determinations to virtual reality;97  
(4) Diminishing Transaction Costs: As a byproduct of the big data 
revolution, the transaction costs for the collection and analysis of data 
have rapidly decreased.98 Therefore, economic restraints on investigatory 
and administrative capacity to impose consequences are rapidly 
decreasing as well, especially with the rise of automated or semi-
automated processes that can be conducted in real time and remotely, and 
can be delegated to other private and public entities.99 Not only are the 
transaction costs of big data governance rapidly diminishing (e.g., 
collection and analysis of digital data for “voter integrity” objectives are 
almost costless), correspondingly, the transaction costs of digitally driven 
deprivations are rapidly diminishing as well (e.g., big data voter purges 
that are database-driven are relatively costless compared with small data 
voter purges); 
(5) Ex Ante and Preventive or Precrime Objectives: Deployment of 
big data programs that may often attempt to achieve ex ante 
objectives100—including preventive justice or precrime determinations 
from digital watchlisting and database screening programs—can lead to 
a range of ex ante harms, including the mediation, interference, and 
obstruction of freedoms and privileges; stigmatization and reputational 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 37; Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and 
Personhood in National Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 343–48 (2002).  
 97. See, e.g., Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at 
790. 
 98. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (observing that governance in the National 
Surveillance State is “spurred on by technological advances that increasingly lower the cost of 
telecommunications, surveillance technology, data storage, and computation power”). 
 99. Multiple experts have documented the rising corporatization and private delegation of 
intelligence activities after 9/11. See, e.g., PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 31, at 178–86; HARRIS, 
THE WATCHERS, supra note 31, at 194–98; O’HARROW, supra note 31, at 98–107. Big data 
technologies have also increased the incentives for this private delegation. See, e.g., Lyon, supra 
note 44, at 9 (“Big Data is currently dominated by commercial and governmental criteria[.] . . . Big 
Data is the strong affinity between the two, particularly in relation to surveillance. Big Data 
represents a confluence of commercial and governmental interests.”); Hu, Small Data 
Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at 817–18 (asserting that datafication 
through big data technologies “[c]an also be understood as the underlying drive to force the issue 
and reinforce the underlying values of big data: a policy impetus currently underway that 
mandates or delegates, often under law or administrative regulation, the collection or sharing of 
more and more data”).  
 100. See supra notes 46–49. 
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costs; restriction of expression, assembly, travel, association, and petition 
rights; deprivations; and other administrative actions;101  
(6) “Guilty Until Proven Innocent” Status: Big data programs may 
facilitate a presumption of guilt when an individual is attached to 
suspicious digital data or database screening results, and may implicitly 
shift the burden of proof to those who are digitally blacklisted. The 
mediation of rights, freedoms, and privileges through largely binary and 
probabilistic big data determinations102 and the inferences of suspicion103 
that inform big data blacklisting programs are inconsistent with the 
presumption of innocence necessary to the principle of liberty. Every 
right and privilege is thus affected and at risk of encumbrance. In effect, 
the government may be able to precondition both innocence and liberty 
upon technological processes by prescribing the criteria and 
consequences for database screening or digital watchlisting systems that 
inform a big data blacklisting program. Without a presumption of 
innocence, there is no presumption of liberty;104  
(7) “Black Box” Problem: In a “Black Box Society,”105 often there is 
a lack of meaningful notice of the full consequences of the big data 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Cole, supra note 1, at 518. Cole observes that a “paradigm of prevention” and ex ante 
determinations or preventive policy can pose a significant threat to liberty interests generally:  
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of preventive motives in ordinary criminal law 
enforcement, preventive coercion imposed without a specific criminal act poses 
distinct normative concerns. When the state acts on the basis of predictions, it 
must necessarily reduce the degree of certainty it demands before imposing 
coercion, because there is an inherent uncertainty about the future. To the extent 
that it restricts an individual’s liberty based on fear of what she might do in the 
future, it disrespects her free will to choose to conform her actions to the law. 
 102. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 78 (observing the distinction 
between “datafication” and digitization, explaining digitization as “the process of converting 
analog information into the zeros and ones of binary code so computers can handle it,” and 
datafication “is to put it in a quantified format so it can be tabulated and analyzed”).  
 103. See id. at 157 (“[B]ecause the government never knows whom it will want to scrutinize, 
it collects, stores, or ensures access to information not necessarily to monitor everyone at all times, 
but so that when someone falls under suspicion, the authorities can immediately investigate rather 
than having to start gathering the info from scratch.”). See also Lyon, supra note 44, at 10 
(observing that “time-honored commitments to the presumption of innocence, or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt are eroded” when big data surveillance is combined with a “‘penal populism’ 
that calls for public protection, reinforced by media-enhanced perceptions of risk”) (citing LUCIA 
ZEDNER, SECURITY 80 (2009)).  
 104. Id. at 162 (“The fundamental trouble is that with such a system we essentially punish 
people before they do something bad . . . . This negates the very idea of the presumption of 
innocence, the principle upon which our legal system, as well as our sense of fairness, is based.”). 
 105. PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 3. Pasquale states that the “term ‘black box’ is a useful 
metaphor . . . given its own dual meaning.” The first meaning is that of a “recording device.” The 
second meaning refers to “a system whose workings are mysterious; we can observe its inputs 
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blacklisting harm and often a lack of access to the full evidence of how 
one came to be digitally blacklisted (e.g., inability to interrogate 
algorithms and databases informing big data blacklisting may be 
classified). Often processes still appear to be small data in nature because 
the big data elements may be obscured; 
(8) “Everyone is a Potential Target”:106 Even with technical notice 
and minimal remedial procedures, the government may digitally blacklist 
anyone with a digital trail or a presence within a database, thus harming 
individuals in ways that may be impossible or impracticable to fully 
detect and understand;  
(9) Small Data Constitution v. Big Data Constitution: Preexisting 
constitutional protections and rights were forged in a small data world to 
protect against small data harms with small data governing ambitions in 
mind. Small data limitations on power were presupposed. The current 
jurisprudence does not impose limiting principles on big data governing 
ambitions or big data harms that are massive in scope and digitally 
derived in nature; and 
(10) Largely Invisible Systemic Harms That Are Digitally Derived or 
Facilitated Yet Difficult to Remediate Technologically: Big data policy 
making and programmatic structures have the capacity to lead to a broad 
range of digitally derived or digitally facilitated systemic harms that can 
implicate multiple freedoms and privileges. Through the technological 
mediation and interference of freedoms and privileges—utilizing 
technologies that may be largely invisible to the common individual—
potential consequences may include the chilling of expressive and 
associational freedoms, infringing upon individual decision-making and 
autonomy interests, and inalienable rights associated with fundamental 
liberty interests as broadly construed within the due process framework 
of protections. At the same time, technological or procedural remedies 
may be unable to redress these harms, for example, because of the 
inherent limitations of big data and because of the way in which big data 
blacklisting programs may lend legitimacy (e.g., the algorithmic-driven 
“predictive judgments” of the science that informs big data may appear 
to support a “reasonable suspicion”) to inherently illegitimate and 
                                                                                                                     
and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.” Id.; see also id. at 6–8 
(“Deconstructing the black boxes of Big Data isn’t easy . . . . It matters because authority is 
increasingly expressed algorithmically.”); Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13, 
at 33 (“Opening up the black box scoring systems to individuals or neutral experts representing 
them is key to permitting them to challenge ‘arbitrariness by algorithm.’”). 
 106. See, e.g., James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center 
(Watch What You Say), WIRED, Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter 
(“[A]ccording to [one intelligence] official: ‘Everybody’s a target; everybody with [digital] 
communication is a target.’”).  
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unconstitutional outcomes (e.g., deprivation or infringement of 
fundamental liberty and equality guarantees absent adequate 
constitutional protections).107 
II.  DATABASE SCREENING AND DIGITAL WATCHLISTING SYSTEMS 
Through big data tools, “blacklisting” consequences can be imposed 
by the government absent an actual “blacklist” or even a “list” of names. 
Unlike the manner in which “blacklisting” practices unfolded in a small 
data world, an overview of the mechanics of potential big data 
blacklisting programs demonstrates that the harms of inferential guilt can 
flow from digitally generated data. Thus, many of the big data 
blacklisting programs discussed below are not necessarily comprised of 
a list of individuals who have been placed on a “blacklist” for government 
consequences. Rather, these programs utilize big data tools to access and 
analyze digital data or databases. Once this data is accessed and analyzed, 
the big data tools can be used deliberately or inadvertently to flag the 
digitally suspicious. Thus, big data blacklisting programs may, but do not 
necessarily, draw up a list of individuals for deprivation purposes. The 
database screening and digital watchlisting systems discussed below 
show that it is often digitalized data deemed guilty and suspicious that is 
flagged by the big data tools, and it is not necessarily guilty or suspicious 
persons who are flagged. 
Because many of these programs are classified or semi-classified, it is 
unclear exactly what digital data or databases, and what statistical 
analytical methods or algorithmic tools, the government engages to 
determine how to assess the “guilt” of those targeted by these big data 
programs. Yet, these programs may facilitate the assessment of a “guilty 
until proven innocent” status.108 To illustrate the new pressures that have 
been placed on the existing due process jurisprudence in challenging 
these big data programs, Part II describes the mechanics of various 
government programs that rely upon big data tools. By necessity, a 
careful description of these programs is a highly technical undertaking. 
A close examination of the big data technologies and the administrative 
systems that support their consequences, however, is required in order to 
more fully appreciate the constitutional harms that may attach to these 
big data blacklisting programs. 
These database screening and digital watchlisting systems, for 
example, include nonclassified programs—such as the No Work List 
                                                                                                                     
 107. See Daskal, supra note 33, at 362 (“[P]re-crime restraints also interfere with the 
important liberty interest in being treated with equal dignity.”). 
 108. LYON, supra note 32, at 185 (“[U]sing personal data analysis and algorithms . . . the 
potential offender, is singled out for attention by virtue of being identified as part of a group with 
certain characteristics . . . the goal is to attach suspicion, perhaps leading to a criminal charge.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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(e.,g., E-Verify), the No Vote List (e.g., SAVE, HAVA, etc.), and the No 
Citizenship List (e.g., S-COMM/PEP, etc.)—and classified or semi-
classified programs—such as the No Fly List and the Terrorist Watchlist. 
In the discussion below, it is important to recognize, however, that the 
big data technologies (e.g., E-Verify and HAVA) discussed here are 
simply representative technologies. SAVE/HAVA database screening is 
not coterminous with the “No Vote List” per se. The technologies are 
rapidly evolving. Multiple big data tools that may potentially 
disenfranchise voters will not be discussed below (e.g., Interstate 
Crosscheck [database screening] Program is not discussed below, 
however, some may argue that it is a “No Vote List”).109 The specific 
database screening systems that are deployed today may not be deployed 
in the future. Thus, the focus of the inquiry in this Article is a 
constitutional one, for instance, how a big data-driven “No Vote List” 
database screening system may impact fundamental liberty interests. 
Finally, it is worth noting that technologies and programs that once 
were not considered “big data” in a small data world (e.g., computerized 
identity data matching systems) have now been transformed in a big data 
world (e.g., big data mass integration systems using complex algorithmic 
tools to conduct identity verification).110 The E-Verify database screening 
system, for example, was recently identified as a “big data” program in 
the White House’s report Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving 
Values.111 In a small data world, this program may not have appeared to 
be sufficiently “big data”-oriented to qualify as a big data program. 
A.  Nonclassified Big Data Programs 
Core constitutional rights and freedoms in a small data world may, in 
the National Surveillance State,112 fare differently from rights and 
freedoms in a big data world.113 A small data world is free of massive 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See, e.g., KRIS W. KOBACH, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ELECTION DIRS., INTERSTATE VOTER 
REGISTRATION CROSSCHECK PROGRAM (2013), available at http://www.nased.org/NASED_
Winter_2013_PP_Presentations/KANSAS.pdf. 
 110. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1489–99 
(2013) (discussing the functionality of various identity verification and identity determination 
systems through a biometric ID cybersurveillance structure).  
 111. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 52–53 (discussing concerns surrounding E-Verify). 
 112. Balkin explains that the “National Surveillance State” necessarily impacts core rights 
and freedoms, as the digital age has ushered in a “new form of governance” that harnesses 
information technologies to serve governmental goals. Balkin, supra note 37, at 3 (“This new 
form of governance is the National Surveillance State. In the National Surveillance State, the 
government uses surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems, to head 
off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services.”).  
 113. The appropriate uses of dataveillance and cybersurveillance in determining public 
policy choices—and the legality and constitutionality of these emerging data-driven 
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databases, invisible dataveillance and cybersurveillance systems, and 
automated or semi-automated data screening programs. In a small data 
world, individuals take for granted the ability to live freely and access 
fundamental liberty interests directly without digital mediation or 
technological obstruction. In a small data world, a citizen can exercise a 
constitutional right or freedom without database screening, digital data 
analysis, or other technological interference by the government or its 
delegates.114  
In contrast, in a big data world, the government can digitally 
mediate—and consequently threaten—privileges, rights, liberty interests, 
and freedoms.115 The processes in which fundamental rights can be 
deprived in a small data world are radically different from the processes 
in which fundamental rights can be deprived in a big data world. In a big 
data world, government analysis and decision-making processes can 
unfold virtually and invisibly,116 for instance, through data screening 
systems. The government may gather data-driven evidence to determine 
guilt in an administrative manner, often embedded within a highly 
bureaucratized structure,117 in a way that is almost impossible to contest.  
The right to work and vote, for example, are rights many citizens 
perceive as fundamental. The discussion below describes how the 
government and its delegates can utilize big data screening tools and 
database-driven, risk-based assessments to impair work opportunities, 
deny the right to vote, and abridge the rights and privileges of citizenship. 
1.  No Work List 
The E-Verify program, jointly operated by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA), 
                                                                                                                     
technologies—have informed the work of multiple experts in recent years. See generally, e.g., 
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 8–9; MOROZOV, supra note 40; Kerr, Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 55, at 802–08; Omer Tene, Big Data for All: 
Privacy and User Control, STAN. L., CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 20, 2012, 4:05 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/09/big-data-all-privacy-and-user-control-age-analytics. 
 114. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1281; Daniel J. Solove, 
Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1107 & n.130 (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the 
government can conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 37, at 12; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 490; Wittes, 
supra note 57, at 2. 
 116. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12. 
 117. LYON, supra note 32, at 74–75 (contending that new forms of surveillance are “‘file-
based’ or bureaucratic surveillance” and elaborating that “modern surveillance methods are 
rationalized using accounting methods and file-based coordination”); see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL 
PERSON, supra note 39, at 13–21 (describing the manner in which modern privacy violations occur 
as a result of corporate and bureaucratic action). 
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is referred to as the “No Work List” in various outlets.118 E-Verify is 
similar to the No Fly List in its adverse impact on U.S. citizens and lawful 
immigrants.119 Critics of E-Verify claim that the database screening 
system has wrongly disenfranchised individuals of the opportunity to 
work in a similar manner that the critics of the No Fly List claim the 
digital watchlisting system has wrongly disenfranchised citizens of the 
opportunity to fly.120  
E-Verify is an Internet-based identity verification system121 that relies 
upon database screening protocols.122 The E-Verify system attempts to 
“verify” the identity or citizenship status of a worker based upon complex 
statistical algorithms and multiple databases.123 Put into simple terms: 
First, an enrolled employer collects personally identifiable data from an 
employee—e.g., the employee’s name, date of birth, photo identification, 
and SSN.124 Next, that employer (or its designated agent) enters the 
gathered information into either the web service or browser based 
software system.125 The data is matched to the SSA database and various 
DHS immigration databases to determine whether the employee may 
legally work.126  
                                                                                                                     
 118. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Employment Verification Would Create a ‘No Work 
List’ in the United States (May 6, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/employment-
verification-would-create-‘no-work-list’-us; Jim Harper, Immigration Reform: REAL ID and a 
Federal ‘No Work’ List, CATO INST. (June 14, 2007), http://www.cato.org/publications/techknow 
ledge/immigration-reform-real-id-federal-no-work-list. For an overview of the E-Verify program 
and some of its legal implications, see generally Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16 (outlining 
the procedures and policies of E-Verify). 
 119. See Harper, supra note 118. 
 120. See, e.g., id. 
 121. Identity verification systems seek to confirm or authenticate identity data presented by 
an individual, checking produced data against an existing database. See, e.g., JENNIFER LYNCH, 
FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 
AND BEYOND 5 (2012). 
 122. WESTAT, WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM: USCIS SYNOPSIS OF KEY 
FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010) [hereinafter WESTAT, EVALUATION OF E-VERIFY], 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%20Docs/Westat%20Evaluation%20of%20
the%20E-Verify%20Program.pdf. 
 123. See E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration Policy & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 34–35 (2011) 
(statement of Theresa C. Bertucci, Assoc. Dir., Enter. Servs. Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs.); WESTAT, EVALUATION OF E-VERIFY, supra note 122, at 1, 5. 
 124. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., I AM AN EMPLOYER: HOW DO I USE E-
VERIFY? 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/E4en.pdf.  
 125. Id. at 1. 
 126. SSA maintains the Numerical Identification File (NUMIDENT) SSN database, which 
includes the name, date of birth, and other biographical information of SSA applicants. ANDORRA 
BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40446, ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION 
2 (2009). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) maintains the 
Verification Information System (VIS) database, which “is comprised of citizenship, 
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Generally, the results of the inquiry are returned to the employer 
within seconds, and the employee’s identity is either “verified”127 or “not 
verified.” If there is an anomalous result from the database screening 
algorithms, the employee falls into a category referred to as “Tentative 
Nonconfirmation” (TNC).128 Upon a TNC result, the employer is 
required to allow the employee to contest the finding.129 It is the 
responsibility of the employee to contact DHS or SSA “within 8 federal 
government workdays to correct the TNC.”130 If the TNC remains 
unresolved, the system generates a “Final Nonconfirmation” (FNC) 
finding.131 If an employee does not contact DHS or SSA, the system 
generates a “No Show” result after ten business days have passed.132 An 
employer can terminate an employee after the employee receives either a 
“No Show” or FNC result.133 
If DHS concludes that the employee did not take sufficient steps to 
correct the mismatch, and if the E-Verify system issues a FNC to the 
employer, then there is no formal process to contest or appeal such a 
determination.134 For those employees who have affirmatively elected to 
contest the TNC through signing an E-Verify form generated by the E-
                                                                                                                     
immigration, and employment status information from several DHS System of Records.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE VERIFICATION INFORMATION 
SYSTEM SUPPORTING VERIFICATION PROGRAMS 2 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_vis.pdf. 
 127. The Verification Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employers/verification-process (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Employee Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/employee-rights-and-responsibilities (last visited Oct. 
16, 2015). 
 130. How to Correct a Tentative Nonconfirmation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/how-correct-tentative-nonconfirmation (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 131. DHS TNCS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-
verify/employers/tentative-nonconfirmations/dhs-tncs (last visited Oct. 16, 2015); see also DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., THE E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR EMPLOYERS (2013) 
[hereinafter DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., E-VERIFY EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MEMORANDUM], 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/site/default/files/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_
Native_Documents/MOU_for_E-Verify_Employer.pdf (“If the employee does not choose to 
contest a tentative nonconfirmation or a photo non-match or if a secondary verification is 
completed and a final nonconfirmation is issued, then the Employer can find the employee is not 
work authorized and terminate the employee’s employment.”). 
 132. DHS TNCs, supra note 131. 
 133. Id. 
 134. John Fay, USCIS Considers Secondary Review Process for E-Verify Final 
Nonconfirmations, LAWLOGIX (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.lawlogix.com/blog/uscis-considers-
secondary-review-process-e-verify-final-nonconfirmations. 
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Verify system, the federal government is then provided two days after the 
original eight business days have passed (for a total of ten business days) 
to make a manual determination as to the individual’s work 
authorization.135 
Despite significant challenges faced by the program thus far, E-Verify 
is poised for mandatory national expansion. At the federal level, E-Verify 
is a voluntary pilot program.136 Yet, multiple state laws have begun to 
mandate that employers within their state use the system. 137 In Chamber 
of Commerce v. Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act,138 which requires all employers in Arizona to run all new 
worker’s information through the E-Verify program.139  
Past and current legislative proposals recommend the national, 
mandatory expansion of E-Verify, for example through the New 
Employee Verification Act140 and proposed comprehensive immigration 
reform bills, including the Bipartisan Senate Immigration Plan introduced 
in April 2013, titled Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act.141 Further, it is significant to note that 
E-Verify use is rapidly expanding. As of September 2015, over 600,000 
                                                                                                                     
 135. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., E-VERIFY EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MEMORANDUM, 
supra note 131, at 9. The manual determination can include putting a case in continuance if more 
time is necessary, for example, if the employee has applied for and is waiting on a replacement 
document. See DHS TNCS, supra note 131. 
 136. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011) (“Originally known 
as the Basic Pilot Program, E–Verify is an internet-based system that allows an employer to verify 
an employee’s work-authorization status.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Congress 
expressly prohibited DHS from requiring private employers to use E-Verify on anything other 
than a voluntary basis. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1324a); see also Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (“‘[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security 
may not require any person or . . . entity’ outside the Federal Government ‘to participate in’ E-
Verify.” (quoting IIRIRA § 402(a), (e))). 
 137. See, e.g., Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, supra note 16, at 608–09 (“The state-by-state 
patchwork of E-Verify schemes is especially problematic, as several states require some or all 
employers use E-Verify. Alabama, Arizona, and Mississippi require all employers to use E-
Verify. Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah require most 
employers to use E-Verify. . . . Many other states require subsets of employers—such as public 
employers, contractors, and subcontractors—to enroll in E-Verify. These states include Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West 
Virginia.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -216 (2015) (prohibiting employers from 
knowingly hiring an “unauthorized alien”). 
 139. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1972, 1985 (holding that an Arizona immigration statute requiring 
employers engage in mandatory E-Verify database screening is not preempted by federal 
immigration law because federal law only prohibits the federal government from mandating 
E-Verify, and nothing in the federal law prohibits states from mandating E-Verify); see also Hu, 
Reverse-Commandeering, supra note 16, at 598–99. 
 140. H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103 (1st Sess. 2009). 
 141. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2013). 
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employers use E-Verify at more than 1.4 million hiring sites to screen 
new hires over the Internet.142 Approximately 1400 new companies join 
this pilot program per week.143 The 52 million U.S. workers hired in 2012 
were subjected to approximately 21.2 million queries in the E-Verify 
system.144 
2.  No Vote List 
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s June 2013 ruling in 
Shelby County v. Holder145 that struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,146 multiple states announced their intention to 
remove noncitizens from voter registration rolls through a database 
screening system referred to as the SAVE database. DHS maintains and 
operates the SAVE database.147 Since the creation of SAVE through the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA),148 SAVE has provided benefits-granting agencies at the 
federal, state, and local level with a method to verify eligibility for 
                                                                                                                     
 142. What Is E-Verify?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/
what-e-verify (last updated June 25, 2015). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Alex Nowrasteh, CATO FOIA Request Reveals E-Verify Delays Hurt Workers, CATO 
INST. (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/cato-foia-request-reveals-e-verify-
delays-hurt-workers. 
 145. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the Voting Rights 
Act’s federal preclearance formula for state election procedures as unconstitutional under the 
Tenth Amendment). Multiple scholars have investigated the constitutional and other legal 
implications of the Voting Rights Act immediately preceding and after the decision in Shelby 
County. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting 
Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2841–42 (2014) (arguing that “the response to Shelby 
County will fail unless it goes well beyond universal protections of voting rights[,]” and that “the 
voting rights regime must also provide robust protection against race discrimination 
specifically”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and 
Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 485–86 (2014) (arguing that Shelby County should be 
viewed “as deeply destabilizing to the infrastructure of voting rights law and policy[,]” and 
undermines the “basic assumptions” that have traditionally included: the “primacy” of “the federal 
government over the states with respect to the authority to regulate elections[,]” “accord[ing] 
Congress a fair amount of deference” in addressing “racial discrimination in democratic 
politics[,]” and the three branches “have generally operated from a similar and fluid conception 
of racial discrimination”); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 95, 121 (2013) (proposing a regulatory approach that requires a disclosure system 
involving a “voting impact statement” of the “likely anticipated effect on access to the ballot and 
any known anticipated impact on minority voters in particular”). 
 146. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. 
 147. What Is SAVE?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/save/what-save/what-save (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).  
 148. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
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government aid programs, such as Medicaid, through identity and 
immigration alien number database screening.149 
In July 2012, one month after the U.S. Supreme Court issued Shelby 
County, thirteen states led by Colorado petitioned DHS for access to its 
SAVE database screening protocols for the purpose of identifying 
possible noncitizens to purge from voter rolls.150 Specifically, DHS 
informed a federal district court that Florida would have access to the 
SAVE database screening system.151 Shortly thereafter, DHS entered into 
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Florida permitting it access 
to SAVE for the purposes of verifying its voter registration rolls.152 In 
August 2012, DHS entered into a similar MOA with Colorado.153 
Florida and Colorado utilize the SAVE database by first drawing upon 
immigration-related information provided by each state’s Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV).154 Next, the state election official compares the 
names of noncitizens in DMV records to the names of registered 
voters.155 State election officials purge individuals from the voter 
registration polls by determining if a voter failed to gain citizenship after 
obtaining a driver’s license (e.g., if the voter remains in the SAVE 
database as an immigrant).156 Under SAVE, an Internet-based query 
searches over 100 million records contained in DHS databases.157 The 
database screening protocol attempts to determine if there is a match 
between the personally identifiable data entered into the database 
screening system and DHS records on an individual’s immigration 
status.158 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 § 404, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009. 
 150. See Letter from Scott Gessler, Colo. Sec’y of State, to Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of 
Homeland Sec. (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/99815699/SOS-Sec-
Napolitano-Ltr-7-9-12-FINAL. 
 151. See Charles Babington, AP Newsbreak: In Victory for GOP, Florida Wins Access to 
Homeland Security List of Noncitizens, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 14, 2012, 8:17 PM), available at 
http://m.startribune.com/nation/162465396.html; Letter from Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Dir., to Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State (June 12, 2012), 
available at http://bradblog.com/Docs/USCIS_Mayorkas_LetterTo_FLDetzner_061212.pdf. 
 152. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., and Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections (Aug. 14, 2012), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/805148/moa-dhs-fl-1.pdf; see also 
Corey Dade, States to Use U.S. Immigration List for Voter Purges, NPR (July 17, 2012, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/17/156880856/states-to-use-u-s-immigration-list-for-voter-purges. 
 153. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., and Colorado Secretary of State (Aug. 22, 2012). 
 154. See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 17, at 67. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 67–68. 
 157. What is SAVE?, supra note 147. 
 158. See id. 
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DHS has granted SAVE database screening access to a total of five 
states for voter registration purges. In addition to Florida and Colorado, 
three states—Iowa,159 North Carolina,160 and Virginia161—have entered 
into an MOA agreement with DHS to access the SAVE database. Five 
counties in Arizona have also entered into an MOA to use the SAVE 
database for the same purpose.162 At least eleven additional states have 
requested access to the SAVE database for voter purges, including 
Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Washington.163  
In addition to SAVE, state election officials currently conduct 
database screening protocols pursuant to the HAVA.164 Per Section 
15483(a) of HAVA, each state is required to create and maintain an 
electronic database that contains all registered voters.165 States are also 
required to verify the identity of voter registration applicants by cross 
checking the last four digits of the applicant’s SSN or driver’s license.166 
The state agency tasked with overseeing elections and procedures is 
required by HAVA to coordinate with SSA for SSN database screening 
purposes.167 If a prospective voter does not have a SSN or a driver’s 
license, the state must assign a voter ID number to the applicant. Critics 
of voter purges under SAVE and HAVA note that neither the SAVE 
database screening system nor the HAVA–SSA database screening 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, State Access to Federal Immigration Data Stirs 
New Controversy in Debate over Voting Rights, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Sept. 12, 2013) http:// 
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/state-access-federal-immigration-data-stirs-new-controversy-
debate-over-voting-rights. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Kara Brandeisky et al., Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on 
Voting Rights Act, PROPUBLICA.ORG (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/voting-rights-by-state-map. 
 162. Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 159; see also Using the Systematic Alien Verification 
for Entitlements (SAVE) Program for Voter Eligibility Verification, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. 
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/using-systematic-alien-verification-
entitlements-save-program-voter-eligibility-verificat. 
 163. Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 159. 
 164. HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666–730 (2002) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012)). 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2012). 
 166. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i). The HAVA database screening protocol statutorily requires that 
state election officials match the voter registration to other database lists with the purported intent 
to more robustly protect voter integrity. Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453, 478–80 (2008). The protocol does not, however, stipulate how the 
matches are to be conducted through a database screening system nor does it specify what steps 
are appropriate once a database match is found. Id. 
 167. See President Signs HAVA, supra note 18. 
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system was designed to verify identity or citizenship status for voter 
registration purposes.168  
3.  No Citizenship List  
S-COMM is an interoperability program that facilitates data sharing 
and database screening protocols between the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), DHS, and local law enforcement agencies.169 As of 
2013, pursuant to a mandate by DHS, S-COMM’s database screening 
protocols were required by all state and local law enforcement 
agencies.170 Consequently, after the mandate, what was formerly a pilot 
program was converted into a mandatory program.171 The mandatory 
database screening protocols required state and local law enforcement 
agencies to run fingerprints collected from suspects against federal 
fingerprint databases.172  
Federal courts have expressed Fourth Amendment and other 
constitutional concerns about detention periods under S-COMM.173 DHS 
responded with policy changes to S-COMM in 2014.174 First, S-COMM 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Janell Ross, Voter Roll Purges Could Spread to at Least 12 States, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/31/voter-
roll-purge_n_1721192.html. 
 169. S-COMM commenced as a pilot program in March 2008 under President George W. 
Bush and was piloted in fourteen jurisdictions by October 2008. AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF 
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. 
 170. See Kirk Semple & Julia Preston, Deal to Share Fingerprints Is Dropped, Not Program, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/06immig.html. 
 171. In 2010, before the efficacy of the piloted program could be fully assessed, DHS 
determined that all state and local law enforcement agencies would be required to implement S-
COMM by 2013. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, on 
Secure Communities—Mandatory in 2013 to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, (Oct. 2, 2010), available at 
http://images.politico.com/global/2012/01/icefoiaoptoutdocs.pdf; see also Julia Preston, 
Resistance Widens to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/politics/13secure.html. 
 172. LYNCH, supra note 121, at 9. 
 173. E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, 
at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28–32 (D.R.I. 2014); 
see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 19, at 2 (responding to federal court 
holdings that “detainer-based detention . . . violates the Fourth Amendment” by directing ICE to 
“replace requests for detention . . . with requests for notification (i.e., requests that state or local 
law enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that person is otherwise in 
custody under state or local authority).”).  
 174. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of 
Secure Communities, 64 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2015) (describing the policy decisions that 
led to the “demise” of S-COMM and the adoption of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP)). 
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was renamed “Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP).175 Although DHS 
stated that the program was “discontinued as we know it,” the changes 
did not appear to impact the database screening protocols of S-COMM.176 
Next, DHS explained that the new program by U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) impacts detainer requests by limiting 
enforcement actions: “[U]nless the alien poses a demonstrable risk to 
national security, enforcement actions through the new program will only 
be taken against aliens who are convicted of specifically enumerated 
crimes.”177 However, “ICE . . . will continue to rely on fingerprint-based 
biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law 
enforcement agencies to the [FBI] . . . for criminal background 
checks.”178  
In short, S-COMM—now the newly renamed PEP—requires local 
and state law enforcement agencies to run biometric and biographical 
data of arrestees through federal government databases to determine an 
individual’s identity.179 Although a gross simplification, S-COMM/PEP 
database screening works in the following way. Local law enforcement 
agencies (LEA), upon arresting a suspect, collect and scan the suspect’s 
fingerprints. The LEA submits the fingerprints, and they are checked 
against the FBI and DHS databases.180 If the fingerprints match one in 
the database, the FBI sends an Immigration Alien Query to the Law 
Enforcement Support Center (LESC). For detention and deportation 
                                                                                                                     
 175. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 19, at 3. 
 176. Id. at 1.  
 177. Id. at 2.  
 178. Id.  
 179. See LYNCH, supra note 121, at 6–8. 
 180. The FBI maintains the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
database. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015). DHS maintains the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) 
database. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED 
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR IDENT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets 
/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf (“IDENT is a Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)-wide system for the collection and processing of biometric and limited biographic 
information for DHS . . . .”). The database screening process can be summarized as follows: 
“1. . . . [T]he arresting LEA sends the subject’s fingerprints and associated biographical 
information to [Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)]/IAFIS . . . . 2. CJIS electronically 
routes the subject’s biometric and biographic information for all criminal answer required (CAR) 
transactions to US-VISIT/IDENT to determine if there is a fingerprint match with records in that 
system.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE 
COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS FOURTH QUARTER 
2–3 (2011) [hereinafter ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy104thquarter.pdf. 
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determinations, multiple databases are researched by the LESC, managed 
by DHS’s ICE.181 
Multiple state immigration laws now require state and local law 
enforcement officials to engage in the biometric data screening protocols 
that are operative in S-COMM/PEP.182 Some of these laws, however, do 
so in a way that expands the scope of S-COMM/PEP.183 For instance, in 
Arizona v. United States,184 the Court upheld § 2(B) of Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070.185 This controversial state law was referred to in the media as 
the “racial profiling” law and the “show me your papers” law.186 Whereas 
PEP targets only those individuals “arrested and booked by a law 
enforcement officer for a criminal violation,”187 Section 2(B) states that 
                                                                                                                     
 181. ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 180, at 4–5. 
 182. For example, Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) includes such a database screening 
provision, Section 2(B), in the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 
113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 
13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070. 
Specifically, Section 2(B) is codified in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015). For an 
overview of Section 2(B), see MOTOMURA, supra note 20, at 64–65, 113–15, 125–26, 138–39, 
151–52; Hu, supra note 16, at 596–604. Several scholars have dedicated important research to SB 
1070 specifically, and local immigration regulation and immigration federalism, and its 
implications. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality 
of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253–54 (2011); 
Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona 
v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7–15 (2013); Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking 
Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: 
State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 632–35 (2012); David 
Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The 
Significance of the Local Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 183. Section 2(B) of SB 1070, for instance, uses the same database screening protocol as S-
COMM pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012) and mandates this database screening protocol 
through express incorporation of the federal immigration statute into the language of the state 
immigration statute. 
 184. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 185. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015).  
 186. Id. at 2507–10 (holding that it was improper to enjoin Section 2(B) on preemption 
grounds because if Section 2(B) “only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the 
course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely 
would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are 
adverse to federal law and its objectives”). 
 187. Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (“PEP begins at the 
state and local level when an individual is arrested and booked by a law enforcement officer for a 
criminal violation and his or her fingerprints are submitted to the FBI for criminal history and warrant 
checks. This same biometric data is also sent to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
so that ICE can determine whether the individual is a priority for removal . . . .”). 
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“where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is 
unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be 
made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the 
person.”188 
B.  Classified and Semi-Classified Big Data Programs 
Big data cybersurveillance and dataveillance tools facilitate the 
government’s ability to target those deemed suspicious by virtue of 
suspect digital data and metadata. Yet, the challenges associated with 
automated or semi-automated decision-making and algorithmic 
intelligence through government-led big data systems can be almost 
impossible to remediate. In other words, the digital mediation of core 
constitutional rights through big data tools can impact both the manner in 
which the government administers and justifies the conferral of rights and 
privileges, and the manner in which the government conducts and 
justifies the deprivation of rights and privileges. 
This problem is particularly acute when the fundamental rights 
involve the potential deprivation of life and liberty without the due 
process of law. The constitutional guarantee of due process of law is 
especially challenged, however, when the government exercises 
deprivations of life and liberty under classified programs that promote 
sensitive national security objectives. The discussion below describes 
how the government can utilize big data screening tools and database-
driven, risk-based assessments to justify digital watchlisting and database 
screening systems to categorize individuals as potential national security 
threats and to single out these individuals for deprivations, such as the 
denial of the right to fly. 
1.  Terrorist Watchlist 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in order to 
administratively formalize terrorist screening and watchlisting, President 
George W. Bush issued a directive, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 6 (HSPD-6), to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), requiring 
the “establish[ment of] an organization to consolidate the Government’s 
                                                                                                                     
 188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015); see also Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 
supra note 16, at 594 (“In Section 2(B) of SB 1070, Arizona mandates that local law enforcement 
determine—during the course of any lawful stop, arrest, or detention—whether an individual is 
lawfully present in the U.S., if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the individual may be 
unlawfully present. Section 2(B), as upheld in Arizona, first requires an inspection of physical 
documents (e.g., driver’s license or immigration document). A follow-up database screening is 
mandated under Section 2(B) if an inspection of the physical identity document cannot confirm 
an individual’s identity and citizenship status.”). 
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approach to terrorist screening.”189 Pursuant to HSPD-6, the DOJ 
established the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) as a multi-agency 
center for coordinating information pertaining to terrorist activity.190 
Then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft established the TSC to 
oversee FBI-related terrorist data collection and screening.191 HSPD-6 
specifically mandated the development of a TSDB as a consolidated 
terrorist watchlist maintained by the TSC,192 combining as many as 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6—Directive on Integration and Use 
of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1234, 1234 
(Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1174.pdf. The 
National Counterterrorism Center summarizes the intent of HSPD-6 in the following way:  
The intent of HSPD-6 was to consolidate all TERRORISM INFORMATION at the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)—whose functions were assumed by 
the [National Counterterrorism Center]—in a classified database that would then 
extract Unclassified, For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS 
for passage to the new organization created by the Attorney General. Thus, 
concurrent with the issuance of HSPD-6, the TSC was established via the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening 
Information to Protect Against Terrorism (TSC [Terrorist Screening Center] 
MOU), which was signed by the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State and 
Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence (on behalf of the 
[Intelligence Community]). 
NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE 6 (Mar. 2013), available 
at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/07/23/march-2013-watchlisting-
guidance/. 
 190. Id. 
 191. According to the FBI, the agency maintains the Terrorist Screening Center as a “24/7 
Operations Center . . . and operates the U.S. Government’s consolidated Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB), often referred to as the ‘Terrorist Watchlist,’ and serves as a bridge between 
law enforcement, Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and international partners.” 
About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screening-center; see also 
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5, Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-35407), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/latif_v__holder_brief_of_plaintiffs-appellants_
filed.pdf.  
 192. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, supra note 189. HSPD-6 
directs the Attorney General  
to (1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current 
information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have 
been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to 
terrorism (Terrorist Information); and (2) use that information as appropriate and 
to the full extent permitted by law to support (a) Federal, State, local, territorial, 
tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector screening processes, and (b) 
diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and 
protective processes.  
Id. 
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twelve preexisting watchlists, including the No Fly List.193 The FBI, 
along with other federal agencies, was specifically tasked with 
coordination of the TSC data collection and the screening processes of 
multiple streams of data (e.g., immigration and border control data, 
passport and visa data, and No Fly List and Transportation Security 
Administration data).194 The TSC-maintained database combined the No 
Fly List with other digitally generated watchlists to create one centralized 
repository for all suspected international and domestic terrorists.195 
2.  No Fly List 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal 
government maintained a modest version of the current list known widely 
as the No Fly List.196 Previously, the FBI issued directives to air carriers 
prohibiting the transport of sixteen specific individuals due to the 
potential terrorist threat they posed to civil aviation.197 Directly after the 
terrorist attacks, the FBI launched the “Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“In creating the 
[Terrorist Screening Database], the government consolidated as many as twelve preexisting 
watchlists, including the No Fly List.”). 
 194. See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 15.  
 195. Id. at 50 (explaining that the Terrorist Screening Center Policy Board Working Group 
maintains the criteria and implementation guidance for the No Fly List and Selectee List); id. at 
app. 7, at 2 (“The TSDB consolidates the U.S. Government’s terrorism screening and lookout 
databases into a single integrated identities database. The TSDB is also known as the 
‘watchlist.’”). 
 196. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSP. SEC. INTELLIGENCE SERV., POWERPOINT: TSA 
WATCH LISTS 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., TSA WATCH LISTS], available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/cases/landmark_cases/asset_ upload_file371_3549.pdf (released into the 
public record by the ACLU as part of a settlement agreement in Gordon v. FBI, No. C-03-1779 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2006)); see also Mohamed, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 525. In Mohamed, the Court 
provides the following historical summary of the No Fly List:  
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the President 
mandated that federal executive departments and agencies share terrorism 
information with those in the counterterrorism community responsible for 
national security. Piehota Decl., ¶ 4. Specifically, Congress directed the TSA, 
“in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers, 
establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers (A) to use information 
from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be 
a threat to civil aviation or national security; and (B) if such an individual is 
identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual 
from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that 
individual.”  
Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3) (2012)). 
 197. See id. 
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Investigation” (PENTTBOM).198 As an outgrowth of the PENTTBOM 
investigation and as the FBI developed leads on the potential identity of 
the 9/11 hijackers, the agency created a separate “Terrorist Watchlist.”199 
The FBI subsequently passed the information to the Federal Aviation 
Administration, which disseminated the information to air carriers.200  
Soon thereafter, the “no transport list” grew from sixteen names on 
September 10, 2001, to almost 600 names by December 2001.201 By that 
time, the lists of potential terrorists had been reclassified because the 
government separated transport risks into two lists: a “No Fly List” and a 
“Selectee List.”202 The No Fly List maintained the names of individuals 
that air carriers were to deny transport.203 The “Selectee List” contained 
names of individuals that air carriers were to select for additional 
screening prior to boarding an aircraft and additional luggage 
screening.204 
C.  Commonality of Big Data Consequences 
Admittedly, each big data blacklisting program discussed in this 
Article entails distinct administrative and technological structures 
informed by separate databases, differing algorithms, and different uses 
of data, including differing data collection and analysis protocols. This 
Article recognizes that because each program operates within different 
factual contexts, there is necessarily a differing administrative structure 
guiding remediation. From a description of the operational impact of 
nonclassified programs—such as the No Work List, No Vote List, and 
No Citizenship List—and classified and semi-classified programs—such 
as the No Fly List and Terrorist Watchlist—the discussion above 
demonstrates how big data programs operated by the government can 
assign a heightened suspicion and facilitate inferences of guilt. 
Heightened suspicion may result from either a data match or a data no-
match in a database screening program or digital watchlisting system. 
Inferences of guilt may appear as labeling an individual as a potential 
terrorist suspect, a future threat to national security, unlawfully present in 
the United States, a criminal alien, or as committing identity fraud. As 
discussed below, data mismatches can trigger heightened suspicion under 
                                                                                                                     
 198. 9/11 Investigation (PENTTBOM), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/9-11-investigation (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 199. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., TSA WATCH LISTS, supra note 196, at 2. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 3. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Shane, supra note 10, at 812. 
 204. Id. 
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the database screening protocols in the No Work List (e.g., E-Verify) and 
the No Vote List (e.g., HAVA).205 Data matches can also trigger 
heightened suspicion in database screening protocols in the No Vote List 
(e.g., SAVE)206 and the No Citizenship List (e.g., S-COMM/PEP).207 
III. BIG DATA BLACKLISTING RISKS  
Part III explores how big data blacklisting describes those categorized 
by the government as administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by 
virtue of suspicious digital data. The big data blacklisting risks described 
below may appear to be procedural in nature (e.g., failure of notice or 
failure to offer an appropriate appeals process). However, this Article 
invites a different perspective—one that views big data harms as 
imposing administratively a “guilty until proven innocent” status upon 
entire classes and subclasses of individuals in a way that is inconsistent 
with fundamental liberty interest protections under substantive due 
process. 
A.  Risks of Nonclassified Big Data Programs 
To help anchor how the government categorizes individuals as “guilty 
until proven innocent,” the discussion below demonstrates how some 
nonclassified big data programs operated by the government can assign 
heightened suspicion through data matches or mismatches in the No 
Work List, No Vote List, and No Citizenship List.  
                                                                                                                     
 205. See, e.g., Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect 
Privacy and Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, 
Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (“In 
almost every case, a mismatch will occur either because the employee is actually not authorized 
to work . . . ; because the employee has not yet updated his or her records with SSA . . . ; or 
because the employer made an error inputting information into the system.”); see also Senate Bill 
Implementing Help America Vote Act (HAVA) Would Disenfranchise Thousands of New Yorkers, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 21, 2005), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/senate-bill-implementing-help-america-vote-act-
hava-would-disenfranchise-thousands-new (describing how SSN mismatches under HAVA 
database screening can disenfranchise voters). 
 206. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Privacy 
Impact Assessment for the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy-pia-%20uscis-save-
20130419.pdf (“If SAVE is unable to find a record pertaining to the applicant or the record has 
discrepant information or a photo mismatch . . . agencies are required to verbally notify the benefit 
applicant that they cannot verify the applicant’s eligibility [and] that there is an additional manual 
verification option.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (explaining that if ICE detects a match through the 
screening process, “ICE then reviews other databases to determine whether the person is here 
illegally or is otherwise removable”); “False Match” Shows No-Fly List Isn’t Perfect, CBS NEWS 
(May 6, 2010, 2:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6466411.html. 
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1.  No Work List 
E-Verify, unlike the No Fly List, has not faced rigorous due process 
challenge.208 Yet, multiple programmatic challenges have plagued E-
Verify since its inception, including allegations that it imposes significant 
barriers to employment opportunities without proper redress 
opportunities. Many of the difficulties documented by those examining 
the E-Verify system show why and how big data database screening 
programs are problematic.209 A fundamental issue begins with 
questioning the underlying databases and the reliability of the data that 
informs the database screening protocol. 
In a 1997 report and a 2002 follow-up report, the Inspector General of 
the DOJ concluded that the underlying data supporting the E-Verify 
system provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
the predecessor of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), was “flawed in content and accuracy.”210 Despite technological 
attempts to upgrade the system over the past decade, such as requiring 
employers to double-check the data they have inputted and directly 
linking the E-Verify system to USCIS databases, multiple challenges 
remain with the system.211 A 2007 evaluation of E-Verify conducted by 
Westat, an independent research organization contracted by DHS, 
concluded that the accuracy of E-Verify had improved substantially from 
its initiation but that the error rate was still too high to allow for the 
mandatory expansion of the pilot program.212 The report specifically 
determined that “the database used for verification is still not sufficiently 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Employers, however, have raised some due process challenges to parts of E-Verify; 
none have been successful. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW 
137–38 (2012). 
 209. See, e.g., Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16; 2009 WESTAT REPORT, infra note 
227. 
 210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. I-2003-001, INSPECTIONS 
REPORT: IMMIGRATION. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S ABILITY TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND 
ACCURATE ALIEN INFORMATION TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 25 (2002), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0301/final.pdf. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. I-97-08, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 
MONITORING OF NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/rep 
orts/INS/e9708/index.htm; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP 
REPORT ON INS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS, REP. NO. I-
2002-006 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0206/index.htm. 
 211. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION: 
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES 
REMAIN (2010) [hereinafter GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/320/314278.pdf. 
 212. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION xxi (2007) [hereinafter 2007 
WESTAT REPORT], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/WebBasicPilot 
RprtSept2007.pdf (report submitted to DHS). 
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up to date to meet the IIRIRA requirement for accurate verification”213 
Discrepancies in the underlying databases, human error in inputting 
data and accessing the system, and other administrative and technological 
complications have resulted from the aggregation and maintenance of the 
E-Verify database screening system.214 For example, a 2006 analysis 
conducted by SSA of its own databases revealed that an estimated 17.8 
million records, or 4.1% contained discrepancies related to name, date of 
birth, or citizenship status and that 12.7 million of these pertained to U.S. 
citizens.215 A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
investigation later determined that between one and four percent of lawful 
immigrants’ “A” files (alien number and record), the primary record for 
all immigrants in the United States, were missing.216 The rate of error was 
considerably higher in regions of the nation with the most active filings, 
such as the San Diego field office, where nearly 21% of all records were 
missing.217  
Other records accessed by the E-Verify system are still in analog form. 
The paper-based files maintained by DHS and other federal agencies are 
in a conversion process to allow for the development of electronic 
formats.218 Yet, the process of converting data from an analog, paper-
based form to a digital, machine-searchable form leaves room for 
additional human error.219  
Furthermore, misspellings and incorrect name order lead to data 
mismatches under the E-Verify database screening system despite the 
fact that SSA algorithms allow for some variation in name order and that 
there is a manual check that comes with contesting a TNC.220 This 
particular problem disproportionately affects women, because of name 
changes due to marriage or divorce, and minorities because foreign 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id. 
 214. DORIS MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF E-VERIFY GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Verification_paper-071709.pdf. 
 215. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A-08-06-26100, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE REPORT: ACCURACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE, ii, 6 
(2006), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-06-26100_0.pdf. 
 216. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-85, IMMIGRATION BENEFITS: 
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ALIEN FILES ARE LOCATED WHEN NEEDED 3–4 
(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/252947.pdf. 
 217. Id. at 4. 
 218. See, e.g., RAPID I-9: Streamlined Electronic I-9 & E-Verify, A-CHECK (Mar. 2010), http:// 
www.acheckamerica.com/media/1638/2012-004_RAPID_I-9-Electronic_I-9_and_E-Verify.pdf.  
 219. MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 214, at 6. 
 220. Name-order errors were also a problem during the 2004 and 2008 U.S. elections when 
the government denied many Asian Americans voting rights as a result. See, e.g., ASIAN AM. 
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, ASIAN AMERICAN ACCESS TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 2008 ELECTIONS 4, 
9 (2009), available at http://aaldef.org/docs/AALDEF_Election_2008_Report.pdf.  
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names are more often transposed.221 Moreover, the databases linked to E-
Verify must constantly be updated as persons change their names, or as 
the immigration or citizenship status of an individual is corrected.222 The 
E-Verify system has faced challenges in staying current with the 
adaptations to the government databases as they unfold on a minute-by-
minute basis.223  
Experts have concluded that these factors together create a database 
screening system that is unreliable and inaccurate in its structure, both 
technologically and programmatically, as well a system that has led to 
widespread discriminatory results in its application. In the 2007 Westat 
report, while E-Verify confirmed U.S. citizens automatically 96% of the 
time, the rate dropped to 72% for lawful permanent residents and only 
63% for other lawful immigrants authorized to work in the United 
States.224 Overall, the proportion of inquiries that produce TNCs has 
decreased to almost 2.6% from the 8% that existed from 2004 to 2007.225 
The percentage of these TNCs that are erroneous, however, “remains 
alarmingly high.”226 According to one estimate, the government issues 
22% of all TNCs to lawful workers,227 while another study places the 
number at a shocking 95% erroneous TNC rate.228 Of the TNCs that the 
government erroneously issues and that individuals later contest and 
resolve, error rates are approximately 0.1% for native-born U.S. citizens, 
1% for lawful permanent residents, 3.2% for foreign-born citizens, and 
5.3% for legal non-immigrants, such as temporary workers and other 
noncitizens who are authorized to work.229 This means that the erroneous 
mismatch rate is thirty times higher for foreign-born workers than for 
those born in the United States and ninety-eight times higher for 
naturalized citizens than native-born citizens.230  
According to various reports, the average time from the date on which 
a worker originally receives a TNC to the resolution of an E-Verify 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 214, at 6. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at 148. 
 225. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211, at 16. 
 226. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, 
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 7 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/E-
Verify-Insight.pdf. 
 227. Id. at 7; see also WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 WESTAT REPORT], available at www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-
Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf (report submitted to DHS). 
 228. ROSENBLUM, supra note 226, at 7. 
 229. 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 208–11.  
 230. See 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at xxv–vi. 
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dispute can range from 12.5231 to 39.7 days.232 If the matter cannot be 
resolved, the federal government has the discretion to issue a “Case in 
Continuance” within the E-Verify system.233 While the government 
attempts to resolve the data mismatch with the employee, the employee 
is often not allowed to work with an intended employer.234 The fact that 
many Americans lack the personal documentation necessary to correct an 
error exacerbates difficulties in resolving data mismatches under the E-
Verify system. A 2006 study by the Brennan Center for Justice estimated 
that 21 million U.S. citizens lack valid identity documents.235 For 
example, 13 million U.S. citizens do not have access to passports, birth 
certificates, or naturalization papers needed to prove citizenship (and, in 
this case, work authorization).236  
Studies have indicated that many employees, particularly those who 
are economically disadvantaged, become discouraged and fail to resolve 
the mismatch, or employers discourage them from contesting the TNC 
result in the E-Verify system.237 Some employers secretly prescreen 
employees through the E-Verify system and fail to notify an employee 
that she has a right to resolve the system error.238 Eighty-five percent of 
all TNCs are uncontested.239  
DHS argues that it monitors E-Verify use by “closely monitor[ing] 
uncontested mismatches and actively reach[ing] out to employers to 
ensure that they are aware of their responsibility to inform employees of 
the right to contest.”240 However, Westat and other experts studying the 
E-Verify system have questioned whether this monitoring of the system 
is sufficient, particularly given the evidence that suggests that the E-
Verify pilot program is subject to employer misuse and abuse. Numerous 
studies have reported finding that “employers do not always follow 
Federally mandated safeguards,” that “not all employers inform their 
employees of verification problems,” and that lawful workers are 
                                                                                                                     
 231. 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 91.  
 232. 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at E-4.  
 233. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR 
EMPLOYERS 16 (2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/E-Verify/ 
Customer%20Support/E-Verify%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide%20for%20Employers%20R3% 
200-%20Final.pdf.  
 234. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211. 
 235. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ 
POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_39242.pdf. 
 236. Id. at 2.  
 237. See id. at 1, 3. 
 238. See 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at 46. 
 239. Id. at 49.  
 240. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY 
STATISTICS, available at http://www.uscis.gov/site-hierarchy/13298/e-verify-program-statistics. 
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consequently “denied not only jobs, but also the opportunity to resolve 
any inaccuracies in their Federal records.”241 
A high percentage of employers failed to inform workers that E-
Verify produced a TNC in connection with their name. This resulted not 
only in a deprivation of an opportunity to correct a false mismatch in the 
E-Verify database system, but also led to the deprivation of an 
employment opportunity. An early study of the program revealed that 
73% of workers whom employers should have notified of a TNC were 
not notified, resulting in E-Verify producing a FNC.242 In a more recent 
study of E-Verify, 98% of employers reported always notifying workers 
of TNCs, but only 58% of individuals who were the subject of TNCs 
recalled employers notifying them, and only 28% of their employee files 
contained signed copies of the notification form.243 Similarly, while 76% 
of employers claimed to always explain the meaning of a TNC to 
individuals receiving them, 54% of workers who had received TNCs did 
not recall receiving an explanation.244 
As a result, violations of the E-Verify system functionally become 
invisible and uncontestable due to the virtual nature of the database 
screening process. Workers, including U.S. citizens and other lawful 
immigrants, are unable to challenge erroneous government records or 
potentially inaccurate data screening protocols due to database 
prescreening that employers conduct in secret. The programmatic 
challenges that have accompanied the E-Verify pilot system thus far 
“illustrate[] the fundamental problem with E-Verify: workers are 
presumed unauthorized for employment unless they prove otherwise.”245 
DHS has attempted to take corrective action.246 USCIS launched the 
Compliance Tracking and Management System in 2009 to monitor the 
                                                                                                                     
 241. INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIV. & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT EVALUATION 
SUMMARY REPORT 19–20 (2002), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111018173337/
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/basicpiloteval_westat&temple.pdf [hereinafter 
BASIC PILOT REPORT]. 
 242. Id. at 20. 
 243. See 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 104, 153–56.  
 244. Id. at 153–54.  
 245. E-Verify System: DHS Changes Name, but Problems Remain for U.S. Workers, ELEC. 
PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (July 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0707/.  
 246. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
E-VERIFY, Employee Email Notifications, http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/employee-
email-notifications. DHS has attempted to correct notice deficiencies related to the E-Verify 
program through the introduction of an email notification program. Id. Employers entering 
personally identifiable data into the E-Verify database screening protocol must include an email 
address if an employee provides one to the employer: 
This latest enhancement to E-Verify is made possible by the new Employment 
Eligibility Verification Form I-9. Employees will notice a new optional data field 
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compliance of employers enrolled in the program.247 Additionally, on 
March 21, 2011, USCIS introduced E-Verify Self Check, which allows a 
prospective employee to go online to correct data errors.248 If 
employment authorization cannot be confirmed, individuals receive 
information on how to resolve potential data mismatches.249 Because Self 
Check is untested, its remedial impact on the E-Verify system is 
unknown. Self Check may in fact open the E-Verify system to other data 
vulnerabilities and programmatic challenges. 
From empirical studies evaluating the efficacy of E-Verify, it appears 
that employers may have denied up to 189,000 U.S. citizens and other 
authorized workers employment opportunities under the database 
screening program.250 Appendix A provides an example of some of the 
consequences faced by individuals alleging employment deprivations by 
the government as a result of the program. 
2.  No Vote List 
To vote, a person’s name must appear on the voter registration roll 
maintained by the county in which he votes.251 States will occasionally 
purge names from their voter rolls, ostensibly to ensure that only those 
eligible to vote can do so.252 A report from thirty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia, for example, stated that local governments purged 
                                                                                                                     
in Section 1 of the revised Form I-9 asking for the employee’s email address; 
this update allows employees to voluntarily provide their email address. When 
the employee provides an email address on Form I-9, employers must enter it 
into E-Verify. The new email notification process does not replace the current 
TNC process. Employers are still required to notify employees of TNCs and their 
right to contest. 
Id. 
 247. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY: 
HISTORY AND MILESTONES 4 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/about-
program/history-and-milestones. 
 248. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DHS LAUNCHES 
E-VERIFY SELF CHECK FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/dhs-launches-e-
verify-self-check-fact-sheet.  
 249. Id.  
 250. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211, at 16. In fiscal year 2009, “about 
189,000 [new hires], received a [Final Nonconfirmation under E-Verify] because their 
employment eligibility status remained unresolved.” Id.  
 251. MYRNA PÉREZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTER PURGES 1 (2008), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voter.Purges.f.pdf. 
 252. See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Ken Cuccinelli’s Voter Purge in Virginia, MSNBC (Oct. 18, 
2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ken-cuccinellis-voter-purge. 
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13 million people from voter rolls from 2004 to 2006.253  
Thus, it is important to look at examples of states that have attempted 
to purge their voter rolls and examine concrete examples of eligible 
voters who found themselves removed from a local voter roll due to 
database error or human error. The HAVA database screening system, 
relying upon SSA’s database, and the SAVE database screening protocol, 
relying upon the immigration records databases of DHS, have been 
criticized as being particularly unreliable for voter purges.254 Appendix 
B gives details on the challenges and consequences that can accompany 
voter purges through database screening.  
3.  No Citizenship List 
Since its inception in 2008, as explained above, S-COMM/PEP has 
facilitated state and local law enforcement data sharing with the FBI and 
DHS, including data sharing through biometric database screening (e.g., 
digital fingerprints).255 S-COMM has been criticized for targeting non-
criminal offenders and for other inefficacies.256 The database, for 
example, has been criticized as outdated and error-prone and the database 
screening protocol appears to facilitate the unlawful detention and 
deportation of U.S. citizens over whom the ICE has no authority.257 
                                                                                                                     
 253. PÉREZ, supra note 251, at 1 (citing U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE IMPACT 
OF THE NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993 ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS FOR 
FEDERAL OFFICE 2005–2006: A REPORT TO THE 110TH CONGRESS 50 (2007), available at http://www. 
eac.gov/assets/1/Page/NVRA%20Reports%20and%20Data%20Sets%202006-2005.pdf). 
 254. See, e.g., id. at 22. 
 255. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECOND 
CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR 
SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 8–
10 (2008) ( “The Interoperability pilot, also known as interim Data Service Model (iDSM), was 
launched in September 2006. . . . [And] “ICE plan[ned] to move Interoperability to full production 
at the first pilot site in October 2008.”), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_
communities/congressionalstatusreportfy084thquarter.pdf. 
 256. See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 20, at 83 (S-COMM “exposes unauthorized migrants 
with no criminal record or only minor convictions to deportation[,]” and in addition, “undermines 
the relationship between police and immigrant communities”); Cox & Miles, Policing 
Immigration, supra note 20, at 134 (explaining that results from empirical evaluation “reveal a 
disparate impact, but cannot identify disparate treatment—the intentional singling out of a racial 
or ethnic group”); Lasch, supra note 20, at 225 (“[T]here has been a general failure of Secure 
Communities to hit its target. . . . some seventy-nine percent of immigrants deported through 
Secure Communities had either no criminal conviction or only a lower level criminal conviction.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 257. See, e.g., KOHLI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (“ICE acknowledges that there might be 
[Automated Biometric Identification System] matches, or hits, for U.S. citizens for a number of 
reasons, including that naturalization data has not been updated in its databases.” (citing Secure 
Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics through April 20, 2011, at 50, 
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, retrieved from http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
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According to one report, as of April 2011, ICE may have erroneously 
apprehended approximately 3600 U.S. citizens through the use of the S-
COMM biometric database screening protocol.258 These mistakes may 
result when faulty information finds its way into the S-COMM database 
screening protocol, and when the database information comes from many 
sources.259  
The U.S. government often denies error in the detention and 
deportation of U.S. citizens. One study has concluded that ICE has not 
detained or deported any U.S. citizens.260 Yet, “[a]ccording to ICE 
records, [from Fiscal Year 2008 to Fiscal Year 2012, immigration] 
detainers were issued on a total of 834 individuals who were actually U.S. 
citizens.”261 Additionally, under S-COMM, through erroneous database 
screening results, it appears that S-COMM mistakenly targeted up to 
5880 U.S. citizens for potential detention and deportation.262 Although it 
appears that ICE identified the database screening errors prior to the 
erroneous detention and deportation of the 5880 U.S. citizens, the fact 
remains that the S-COMM database screening protocols may have 
wrongfully targeted thousands of U.S. citizens. This potentially indicates 
programmatic challenges such as inaccurate algorithms, unreliable data 
in the underlying databases, inaccurate biometric data captured or entered 
into the database possibly from human error, other implementation 
failures, or other technological or program management difficulties. 
Given the continued debate on this topic, it is important to look at 
news accounts of those who ICE has unlawfully detained because of 
database error. Appendix C contains examples of U.S. citizens who ICE 
                                                                                                                     
sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf)); CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, NAT’L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK, & CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRATION JUSTICE 
CLINIC, Briefing Guide to Secure Communities 3 (2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/sites/ 
default/files/assets/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%20
8-2-2010%20Production.pdf. 
 258. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (“[W]e find that approximately 3,600 US citizens 
have been apprehended by ICE from the inception of the program through April 2011[,]” 
extrapolating from 1.6% of cases where U.S. citizens were apprehended by ICE in study of “a 
random national sample of 375 individuals who were identified as ‘IDENT-Matches’ by the 
Secure Communities Program”).  
 259. See id. 1–2 (explaining that the S-COMM database screening protocol includes 
forwarding information to the FBI and DHS, and “DHS checks the fingerprints against the 
Automated Biometric Identification System, also known as IDENT, a fingerprint repository 
containing information on over 91 million individuals, including travelers, applicants for 
immigration benefits, and immigrants who have previously violated immigration laws”). 
 260. See W.D. Reasoner & Jessica Vaughan, Secure Communities by the Numbers, Revisited 
(Part 1 of 3): Analyzing the Analysis, CTR. FOR IMMIG. STUD. (Dec. 2011), http://cis.org/SC-by-
the-numbers-critique-part1.  
 261. TRAC IMMIGRATION, WHO ARE THE TARGETS OF ICE DETAINERS? (2013), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/. 
 262. See Julia Preston, U.S. Identifies 111,000 Immigrants with Criminal Records, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/13ice.html. 
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erroneously and unlawfully detained, including U.S. citizens subjected to 
erroneous deportation.  
B.  Risks of Classified and Semi-Classified Big Data Programs 
At the dawn of the big data revolution, as explained above, 
unprecedented governmental access to public and private data led to an 
unprecedented asymmetric power between the state and citizen. As can 
be better understood through a careful examination of big data programs 
that may be informed by classified and semi-classified information 
gathering systems, the power asymmetries are especially pronounced 
when national security objectives heighten governmental power while the 
administrative state objectives may weaken the position of the citizen in 
relationship to the government.  
Big data technologies facilitate the government’s ability to search for 
suspicious data. Therefore, newly emerging big data programs allow for 
the tracking and isolation of digitally generated data deemed 
“suspicious,” including “suspicious” metadata, “suspicious” 
associational and geolocational data, “suspicious” correlative data and 
data patterns, and other mass integrative record data and algorithmic 
matching data that can be construed as “suspicious.” One of the key risks, 
therefore, is an inability to remediate one’s “guilty until proven innocent” 
status. Overcoming the inferential guilt facilitated by big data tools may 
be nearly impossible due to the classified and semi-classified position of 
the data that has singled out individuals for suspicion. Algorithmic 
intelligence systems structured to support big data programs, and 
defended as statistically accurate, may be nearly impossible to challenge 
as well.  
1.  Terrorist Watchlist 
Due to the classified nature of the intelligence that informs the 
fulfillment of the unclassified criteria for placement on a terrorist 
watchlist, an individual’s ability to understand and challenge their 
inclusion on a watchlist is limited.263 “The lesser standard for inclusion 
in the broader TSDB . . . requires a reasonable suspicion that the 
individual is a known or suspected terrorist.”264 The criteria for inclusion 
                                                                                                                     
 263. See, e.g., Defendants’ Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition at 52, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR (D. 
Or. May 28, 2015) (stating that when faced with the reasons for a nomination to the No Fly List, 
the United States has argued “such inquiries would inevitably seek to scrutinize reasons for the 
No Fly determination and support for them—the vast majority of which would implicate classified 
national security and law enforcement information”). 
 264. Id. at 5 n.3 (citing Declaration of TSC Deputy Director for Operations G. Clayton Grigg, 
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on the No Fly List require a higher standard. Specifically, the United 
States has explained that “any individual, regardless of citizenship, may 
be placed on the No Fly List if the TSC determines that he or she 
represents: a threat of committing an act of international terrorism . . . or 
an act of domestic terrorism.”265  
According to a public report issued by the DOJ’s Office of the 
Inspector General, names “enter the master TSDB through a so-called 
‘nomination process.’”266 Staff from the FBI and TSC assess levels of 
terrorist-related suspicion based upon “‘whether or not the person is an 
appropriate candidate for inclusion’ on the consolidated watch list and 
‘whether or not sufficient identifying information is available.’”267 The 
nomination and determination process has been criticized for its failure 
to rigorously and individually assess appropriate inclusion. It has also 
been criticized for a lack of any minimum qualitative guideline or 
quantitative baseline for investigatory or evidentiary standards.268  
“[T]he U.S. Government’s consolidated Terrorist Screening Database 
(TSDB) [is] often referred to as the ‘Terrorist Watchlist,’ and serves as a 
bridge between law enforcement, Homeland Security, the Intelligence 
                                                                                                                     
May 28, 2015 (Grigg Decl.) ¶ 15). 
 265. Id. (citing See Gen. Stipulations [Dkt. No. 173] ¶ 5; Declaration of TSC Deputy Director 
for Operations G. Clayton Grigg, May 28, 2015 (Grigg Decl.) ¶ 17.3). The specific criteria for 
inclusion on the No Fly List includes: 
[1] a threat of committing an act of international terrorism (as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(1))[;]  
[2] or [a threat of committing] an act of domestic terrorism (as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(5)) with respect to an aircraft (including a threat of air piracy, or 
threat to an airline, passenger, or civil aviation security); 
[3] or a threat of committing an act of domestic terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2331(5)) with respect to the homeland;  
[4] or a threat of committing an act of international terrorism (as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(1)) against any U.S. Government facility abroad and associated 
or supporting personnel, including U.S. embassies, consulates and missions, 
military installations (as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4)), U.S. ships, U.S. 
aircraft, or other auxiliary craft owned or leased by the U.S. Government;  
[5] or a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and who is 
operationally capable of doing so.  
Id. 
 266. Shane, supra note 10, at 815–16 (citing AUDIT DIV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Audit Rep. 05-27, Review of the Terrorist Screening Center 41–43 (2005) 
(redacted for public release), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf). 
 267. Id. at 816 (citation omitted). 
 268. See, e.g., id. at 816–17. 
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Community, and international partners.”269 Because the TSC databases 
and Terrorist Watchlist contain classified information, it is difficult to 
confirm or interrogate the protocols, methodologies, and other systems in 
which the government compiles, maintains, analyzes, and utilizes the 
digital watchlists for policy making.  
2.  No Fly List 
Currently, the FBI, through the TSC, develops and maintains the No 
Fly List, which consists of the names of individuals whom airlines 
serving or flying within the United States may not transport.270 The No 
Fly List is a subset of the TSDB, and DHS defines it as “a list of 
individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft.”271 In other 
words, the government prohibits most individuals on the list from flying 
into, out of, or over Canadian and American airspace.272 The Selectee 
List, another subset of the TSDB, is “a list of individuals who must 
undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an 
aircraft.”273  
In recent years, litigation has forced the disclosure of information on 
what specific data ultimately supports a decision to place an individual 
on the No Fly List. Scholars have noted concerns associated with a 
combination of public–private intelligence-gathering partnerships that 
focus on data capture and data analytics.274 In particular, criticism has 
been leveled that these public–private data partnerships “have enabled the 
Executive to operate outside of the congressionally imposed framework 
of court orders and subpoenas, and also outside of the ambit of inter-
branch oversight.”275 Regarding due process safeguards and other 
constitutional concerns, some suggest that the private data gathering 
conducted by TSC potentially surpasses ex ante constitutional 
protections, while also removing any remaining ex post facto 
protections.276 
                                                                                                                     
 269. About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screening-center. 
 270. Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1262 (D. Or. 2014). 
 271. Mohamed, supra note 193 (quoting the declaration of Christopher M. Piehota, 
appointed director of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) on April 10, 2013) (Piehota Decl., 
¶ 16).  
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. (Piehota Decl., ¶ 16). 
 274. See generally O’HARROW, supra note 31; PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 31; Jon D. 
Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private–Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on 
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008).  
 275. See id. at 904. 
 276. See id. (stating that these agreements “leave Congress and the courts ill-equipped . . . to 
intervene to remedy individual instances or patterns of injustice”). 
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Although TSC is the final arbiter on whether an individual remains in 
the TSC database, TSC does not accept redress inquiries.277 Rather, an 
individual petitioning to have their name removed from either the No Fly 
List or Selectee List must submit a form to DHS Traveler Inquiry Redress 
Program (DHS TRIP).278 DHS TRIP then communicates the inquiry to 
TSC, which makes a decision on the redress request without providing 
any further information.279 TSC notifies DHS TRIP of the decision, and 
DHS TRIP, in turn, contacts the petitioner.280 Until recently, despite a 
decision on the status of the No Fly List petitioner, DHS TRIP’s final 
communication with the petitioner “neither confirms nor denies the 
existence of any terrorist watch list records relating to the individual” and 
further does not state whether the individual may fly in the future.281 In 
effect, individuals previously had no way to confirm their placement on 
the No Fly List unless they were denied entry onto a commercial airplane.  
The No Fly List litigation forced a revision of the prior notice and 
redress procedures after it was found to be procedurally defective under 
procedural due process.282 These revised redress procedures for the No 
                                                                                                                     
 277. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1031, TERRORIST WATCH LIST 
SCREENING: EFFORTS TO HELP REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC 31 (2006) [hereinafter 
GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251875. 
pdf; see also TSC Redress Procedures, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/nsb/tsc/tsc_redress (last visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 278. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(G)(i) (2012) (requiring the TSA to “establish a timely and 
fair process for individuals identified as a threat under [the screening system] to appeal to the 
[TSA] the determination and correct any erroneous information”); id. § 44926(a) (“The Secretary 
of Homeland Security shall establish a timely and fair process for individuals who believe they 
have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they were wrongly 
identified as a threat under the regimes utilized by the [TSA].”). 
 279. See LIZZY GARY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE DHS TRAVELER 
REDRESS INQUIRY PROGRAM (DHS TRIP) 2 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/privacy-pia-update-dhs-all-dhstrip-20130605.pdf. 
 280. Id. at 4. 
 281. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING, supra note 277, at 31. For example, the letter 
addressed to one of the plaintiffs in Latif v. Holder stated:  
Security procedures and legal concerns mandate that we can neither confirm nor 
deny any information about you which may be within federal watchlists or reveal 
any law enforcement sensitive information. However, we have made any 
corrections to records that our inquiries determined were necessary, including, 
as appropriate, notations that may assist in avoiding instances of 
misidentification. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.1, Latif v. Holder, No. 10-CV-750-BR, 2011 WL 1667471 (D. Or. May 
3, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 282. See Defendants’ Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Opposition at 273, Latif v. Holder,No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. May 
28, 2015).  
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Fly List became available to the public in March 2015.283  
Under the new redress procedures, individuals trying to challenge 
their inclusion on the No Fly List may receive “notice” of their 
inclusion.284 The redress procedures, thus, may not provide individuals 
with any summary of information at all in some circumstances.285 
Further, “[b]ecause No Fly List determinations are typically based on 
sensitive and classified information, this summary necessarily may not 
reflect the complete factual basis for inclusion.”286 The redress 
procedures, thus, may provide individuals with an incomplete summary 
of information in other circumstances.287 The new redress procedures do 
not include procedurally guaranteed access to the underlying evidence 
that may have led to one’s nomination to the No Fly List (e.g., collected 
data, witness statements, and reports).288 The new redress procedures 
further do not include live adversarial proceedings that provide a 
challenger an opportunity to confront witnesses, interrogate the scientific 
validity of the methods that led to deprivation, or analyze or dispute the 
evidence compiled against the individual.289  
The revised redress procedures do not appear to provide a method to 
determine whether an individual is on the Selectee List.290 However, the 
possibility of an internal administrative appeal or judicial review in a U.S. 
Court of Appeals exists under 49 U.S.C. § 46110.291 Travelers may also 
attempt to preemptively determine their status by opting in to the TSA’s 
Pre-Check system,292 which expedites screening (and ostensibly 
                                                                                                                     
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. (citing Notice Regarding Revisions to DHS TRIP Procedures [Dkt. No. 197]; 
Declaration of Deborah O. Moore, Branch Manager of the Transportation Security Redress 
Branch in the Office of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement at 
TSA, May 28, 2015 (Moore Decl.) ¶¶ 12–13). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 34 (citing Dkt. No. 173 ¶¶ 17–18; Grigg Decl. ¶ 46; Moore Decl. ¶¶ 18–19). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 39 (stating that according to the United States, “Plaintiffs should not be granted 
the right to crossexamine individuals, let alone any sources of intelligence or investigative 
information provided to the Government, in this national security context”). 
 289. Id. at 40 (stating that according to the United States, “the specific circumstances 
strongly weigh against a live adversarial hearing to contest No Fly determinations”). 
 290. DHS explains that “[t]he U.S. government does not reveal whether a particular person 
is on or not on a watchlist.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC., TRAVELER REDRESS 
INQUIRY PROGRAM, Step 1: Should I Use DHS TRIP?, http://www.dhs.gov/step-1-should-i-use-
dhs-trip. 
 291. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 292. See TSA Pre Check, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-pre-check (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
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boarding) by pre-checking credentials against the terrorist database.293 
The DHS Privacy Office noted in a 2006 report that the existing redress 
procedures and mechanisms varied in both procedure and effectiveness 
across the many agencies involved in the watchlists and recommended a 
robust centralized screening procedure.294 From the published redress 
procedures, DHS appears to focus redress relating to persons 
misidentified as being included on a watchlist.295  
A 2007 DOJ report estimated that the No Fly List contained over 
700,000 names and further reported that the list was “increas[ing] by an 
average of more than 20,000 records each month.”296 A 2012 GAO report 
noted an increase in individuals denied boarding or selected for 
screening, but it did not report any data on the specific volume of the 
current list.297 At the time, the FBI reported approximately 550,000 
names on the No Fly List, including 500 U.S. citizens.298  
The TSC offers an internal auditing process that periodically 
determines the appropriateness of an individual’s inclusion on the list. 
For instance, the government removed almost 3700 names between July 
and October of 2004.299 However, despite the remedial procedure and 
internal auditing process, the list has continued to misidentify individuals 
and produce both false positives and false negatives. For example, 
individuals denied access to a commercial flight or repeatedly detained 
include a U.S. Marine returning from Iraq,300 a U.S. Senator,301 and a U.S. 
House Representative.302 A 2004 audit of the TSC by the DOJ found 
multiple deficiencies in the watchlist databases—errors of both 
                                                                                                                     
 293. It remains an open question whether a “pre-checked” passenger could still run afoul of 
a watchlist by virtue of a database error.  
 294. MAUREEN COONEY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, REPORT ON EFFECTS 
ON PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 16–21 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
privacy/privacy_rpt_nofly.pdf.  
 295. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC., TRAVELER REDRESS INQUIRY 
PROGRAM, supra note 290 (“[I]f you have been selected for secondary screening on multiple 
occasions you might be able to use DHS TRIP to resolve issues such as misidentification.”). 
 296. Justice Department Report Tells of Flaws in Terrorist Watch List, CNN (Sept. 6, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/06/terror.watchlist/.  
 297. See Andrea Stone, No-Fly List Maintained by FBI Includes Double the U.S. Citizens 
Since 2009, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/01/no-fly-list_n_1563261.html.  
 298. Id.  
 299. Shane, supra note 10, at 817.  
 300. ‘No-Fly’ List Delays Marine's Iraq Homecoming, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2006, 11:06 
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12284855/#.UW4K_JO86So.  
 301. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17073-2004Aug19.html.  
 302. Ted Barrett, Kennedy Has Company on Airline Watch List, CNN (Aug. 20, 2004, 7:18 
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/20/lewis.watchlist/index.html. 
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overinclusion and underinclusion.303 Moreover, a later study showed that 
the list contained unreliable data, with 35% of the names on the list 
characterized as “outdated.”304  
The potential unreliability of these systems has led critics to question 
the accuracy of the data-driven programs that have placed an estimated 
500 U.S. citizens on the No Fly List,305 5000 U.S. citizens on the Terrorist 
Watchlist,306 and 15,800 U.S. citizens on the Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment (TIDE) database307—the “central repository”308 of known 
or suspected international terrorists.309  
Appendix D summarizes the circumstances of some of the U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents claiming due process harms 
resulting from allegedly erroneous placement on the No Fly List. 
IV.  BIG DATA BLACKLISTING AND THE DUE PROCESS INQUIRY 
As explained above, procedural due process is simply the concept 
enshrined in the Constitution that when the government deprives a citizen 
of an interest in life, liberty, or property, the citizen is given notice and 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST 
SCREENING CENTER xiv–xv, 48–66 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf (noting incorrect information in records that would tend to produce 
false positives, but also errors resulting in false negatives). 
 304. See Watch Lists, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/watch-lists (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2015). 
 305. See, e.g., No-Fly List Doubles in a Year—Now 21,000 Names, CBS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012, 
3:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-fly-list-doubles-in-a-year-now-21000-names/; see 
also ACLU Factsheet, available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/factsheet-aclus-
challenge-us-governments-no-fly-list. 
 306. Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-Tracking System, 
By the Numbers, INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2014), available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08 
/05/watch-commander/; see also Terrorist Watchlist, INFO. SHARING ENV’T, http://www.ise.gov/ 
terrorist-watchlist (“The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the U.S. government’s 
consolidated Terrorist Watchlist[-]which supports the ability of front line screening agencies to 
positively identify known or suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board 
aircraft, or engage in other activity.”). 
 307. Terrorist Watchlist, supra note 306 (“The National Counterterrorism Center manages 
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which serves as the U.S. government’s 
central repository of information on international terrorist identities as established by the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. TIDE supports the [U.S. 
Government’s] various terrorist screening systems or ‘watchlists’ . . . .”).  
 308. Id.; see also INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2014), available 
at https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/2014_ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_0.pdf.  
 309. The total number of individuals in TIDE is estimated to be over 740,000 persons, of 
which only a small percentage are U.S. citizens. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42336, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING AND BRADY BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR 
FIREARMS 10 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42336.pdf (reporting that as 
of December 2011, “TIDE contained over 740,000 persons”). 
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an opportunity to be heard.310 Substantive due process turns on abstract 
liberty concepts, including “individual dignity and autonomy,” “personal 
identity,” and other rights that courts may construe as inalienable.311 
Substantive due process rights are often viewed as a protection of rights 
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”312 Rights 
that are not “fundamental” or “deeply rooted” are subject to lesser 
scrutiny. “All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated 
pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”313 
Its origins “lie in natural law concepts that predate the doctrine’s 
association with due process,” and it holds “that once particular rights 
became vested in individuals, the legislature [is] without power to rescind 
those rights.”314 For example, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
held that, under substantive due process, “same-sex couples may exercise 
the right to marry.”315 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court explained that 
“the fundamental liberties protected by this [Due Process] Clause include 
most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,”316 and, further, that 
historical “principles and traditions . . . demonstrate that the reasons 
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to 
same-sex couples.”317 The Court elaborated that “these liberties extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, 
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”318 
As Richard Fallon observes, substantive due process consists of “what 
                                                                                                                     
 310. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).  
 311. See supra note 70 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“In 
addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965)); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citation omitted); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 726 (1997) (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 312. Glucksberg, 521 at 721 (citation omitted).  
 313. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593. 
 314. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 
408, 423 (2010) (citations omitted); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present 
in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540 (2012); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale 
of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental 
Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
 315. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599, 2604–05 (2015). 
 316. Id. at 2597 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147–49 (1968)). 
 317. Id. at 2599. 
 318. Id. at 2597 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–86 (1965)). 
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the Supreme Court takes to be widely shared intuitions or principles that 
impose duties on government and define standards of reasonableness that 
constrain governmental pursuit even of acceptable goals.”319 
A.  Substantive Due Process and Informational Privacy Rights 
The applicability of substantive due process protections as a vehicle 
to shield individuals from overreaching and normalized government 
dataveillance under newly emerging big data tools remains a complicated 
and perhaps wishful potentiality, but one that must be considered. Recent 
cases like United States v. Jones320 have raised—but largely avoided 
answering—the question of whether and how the Fourth Amendment 
might protect individuals from government surveillance in the context of 
law enforcement investigation.321 Yet, even if the Fourth Amendment 
may eventually be found to have teeth enough to post limits on the 
cybersurveillance of law enforcement authorities, it will provide no 
assistance to individuals outside the law enforcement context. In the 
National Surveillance State, big data cybersurveillance and big data 
bureaucratized surveillance systems often operate administratively across 
a much broader spectrum than that of law enforcement.322  
Resorting to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the form of 
substantive due process protection of individual privacy in a big data 
world remains a speculative but perhaps necessary venture if 
constitutional protections are to keep pace with technological leaps and 
bounds in the realms of big data cybersurveillance and mass 
dataveillance. An informational right of privacy is not exactly 
unprecedented, although it is unestablished and stridently opposed by at 
least two of the Court’s current Justices. In 2011, in concurring opinions 
in NASA v. Nelson,323 Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas 
criticized the notion that the Constitution might protect informational 
                                                                                                                     
 319. Fallon, supra note 67, at 323.  
 320. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 321. In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the majority focused on the 
government’s physical trespass affecting property to find that a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment had occurred. Two concurring opinions emphasized that the Court’s current Fourth 
Amendment tests (one test relies on trespass, the other is the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test) will be increasingly inapplicable to technology-based cases in the future. 
 322. The converse is equally true: Where the Fourth Amendment does apply, a party 
generally will not have to resort to the due process clause. “Where a particular Amendment 
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of 
government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due 
process’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 
(1994) (quoting Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).  
 323. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).  
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privacy.324 Their position is consistent with their broader opposition to 
the notion of substantive due process in the first place—something that, 
of course, would vitiate substantive due process as a restraint on big data 
blacklisting harms.325 
Nevertheless, the Court in Nelson avoided deciding whether a 
constitutional right of informational privacy exists. Instead, assuming 
that such a right does exist, it held that it was not offended by the 
government inquiring into the past history of drug use of private 
government contractors and employees.326 Justice Samuel Alito authored 
the majority opinion, adopting a restrained approach and potentially 
reflecting the Court’s reluctance to recognize or expand a constitutional 
right to informational privacy. One could speculate that discarding a right 
to informational privacy at the dawn of big data—when the implications 
of big data are not fully understood by anyone, let alone the judiciary—
may not have seemed prudent to the Court. In fact, cases like Jones 
suggest strongly that the Court may be open to retooling Fourth 
Amendment doctrine if its current jurisprudence remains incapable of 
applying effective restraints on cybersurveillance and dataveillance by 
the government. While Nelson is certainly not a bellwether of a similar 
inclination in the context of due process rights, its restraint may indicate 
something more than a necessary compromise between Justices of 
differing ideological outlooks.327 
                                                                                                                     
 324. Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Nelson: “Our due process precedents, even 
our ‘substantive due process’ precedents, do not support any right to informational privacy.” Id. 
at 161 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF 
DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152–54 (2013) (explaining that, under the 
category of an informational right to privacy, “the Court has ‘referred broadly to a constitutional 
privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’”) (citing Nelson); see also Lior 
Stahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2010) (arguing that “the 
constitutional right to information privacy . . . ought to much more closely resemble privacy tort 
law” and in “constitutional adjudication” the courts should ask three questions: “Whether the 
information is private,” “What the applicable social norms are,” and “What social interests are 
vindicated by privacy”); Lior Stahilevitz, The Centenarian Who Wasn’t, NASA v. Nelson and the 
Constitutional Right to Information Privacy, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:37 AM), 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/09/the-centenarian-who-wasn’t-nasa-v-nelson-and-the-
constitutional-right-to-information-privacy.html) (discussing the Court’s treatment of the 
constitutional right to privacy in Nelson, concluding that the “applicable frameworks for deciding 
whether the government’s conduct violates the constitutional right to information privacy are by 
no means sensible”). 
 325. “[T]he very idea of substantive due process has been contested.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 571 (5th ed. 2015).  
 326. “We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort 
mentioned in Whalen and Nixon. We hold, however, that the challenged portions of the 
Government’s background check do not violate this right in the present case.” Nelson, 562 U.S. 
at 138. 
 327. Sullivan and Massaro point out that while conservatives may oppose substantive due 
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What Nelson did was enable precedent on informational privacy rights 
to survive—precedent that Justices Scalia and Thomas thought should be 
overruled. The Court identified two cases that have opened the door to 
the notion of constitutional protection of informational privacy. One was 
Whalen v. Roe,328 a 1977 case that dealt with an early form of big data—
a database storing the identities of persons receiving prescriptions for 
drugs that New York authorities deemed to be dangerous.329 Nelson also 
preserved as precedent Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.330 
That case concerned a statute331 that Congress passed in the wake of 
Watergate and Nixon’s resignation that was designed to protect Nixon’s 
presidential records and tapes.332 Besides the government’s interest in 
collecting the information, the Whalen and Nixon Courts appeared to be 
swayed by the fact that the harvest of informational data was the least 
intrusive means for the government to pursue its legitimate and 
compelling aims. Litigants in the modern context will need to raise the 
same query. A case challenging the governmental storage and big data or 
metadata screening of personally identifiable information will be all the 
stronger if a litigant can suggest an alternative, more restrictive way to 
achieve the government end without so broadly violating the privacy of 
the citizenry.  
Both Whalen and Nixon make clear that raising a substantive due 
process claim in the modern context would thus prompt a twofold inquiry 
of big data. First, to determine if the government’s accumulation and use 
of big data poses a constitutional threat, the Court would have to inquire 
into whether there are safeguards to prevent unauthorized informational 
access that would violate constitutional informational privacy interests or 
other means of unwarranted disclosure. Secondly, the Court would need 
to determine whether the statutory and regulatory framework governing 
informational privacy has sufficiently kept pace with the technological 
innovations enabling the government to collect and use big data.  
A strong contention is that a government-led big data program, in and 
of itself, constitutes a substantive due process problem when it results in 
a “suspicion upon a suspicion” problem (e.g., “suspicion”—digitally-
                                                                                                                     
process rights, there is also strong element of conservatism that joins with liberalism in a suspicion 
of unrestrained governmental powers. “Conservative libertarians, as well as many liberal 
progressives, likely regard informational privacy as worthy of constitutional, not merely statutory, 
protection and thus may favor a more elastic view of due process than a narrow ‘history and 
tradition’-based approach might allow.” SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 324, at 153. 
 328. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 329. Id. at 592–93. 
 330. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).  
 331. Presidential Recordings and Material Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 
1695 (1974).  
 332. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 431–32.  
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generated or big data-generated suspicion that the government or its 
delegates may believe is actionable—based “upon a suspicion”—
suspicious digital data or database screening result). Any resort to big 
data cybersurveillance or mass dataveillance systems, in the context of 
government programs which grant or deny eligibility for rights or 
privileges, or programs which may mediate or interfere with freedoms or 
liberty interests, may pose a constitutional challenge. On this score, those 
programs that subject individuals to big data blacklisting harms would be 
subject to strict scrutiny analysis: The government must show that its 
reliance on big data is necessary and narrowly tailored to the use it is 
serving, and serves a compelling state interest.333 Or, in the alternative, 
in the case of the No Fly List, for instance, the government could be 
compelled to develop an alternative process: A nomination and appeals 
system must involve small data processes and human intelligence that an 
individual can fairly contest (e.g., interrogate witnesses, directly 
challenge the evidence).  
B.  Substantive Due Process Approach to Systemic Big Data 
Blacklisting Harms 
The Court in Whalen initiated a theory of informational privacy rights 
and the question of whether substantive due process should encompass 
privacy expectations related to the collection and use of digital data, 
including database systems. A procedural due process approach may 
appear to be the most logical given the framework that courts use to 
analyze both substantive and procedural due process deprivations. This 
Article, however, contends that digital watchlisting and database 
screening systems should be critiqued collectively; thus, the focus of the 
constitutional inquiry should be on the protections afforded by 
substantive due process. Unlike many other constitutional claims that are 
fact-dependent and generally center around individual rights, due process 
doctrine generally, and substantive due process in particular, can be 
viewed as a systemic-type remedy to address system-wide harms.334 
Additionally, procedural due process assumes that mediation of a right 
was itself proper, whereas substantive due process interrogates the 
propriety of the mediation of a fundamental right in the first instance.335 
                                                                                                                     
 333. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 33, at 377 (“A searching inquiry into the No Fly List, for 
example, reveals the way it burdens, albeit without extinguishing, long-recognized interests in 
interstate travel, association, and pursuit of employment of one's choosing. . . . Ultimately, the 
courts should be pushing the Executive toward a narrow tailoring of restraint to need.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 67, at 311 (“[A]lthough we characteristically think of 
constitutional rights in individualistic terms, due process doctrine has developed a strikingly 
managerial aspect.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
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Consequently, under procedural due process, the court focuses its inquiry 
on the method of mediation (e.g., evidentiary hearing, notice, and an 
impartial judge),336 whereas under substantive due process, the court 
typically engages a strict scrutiny review to analyze the precise issue 
before it (e.g., whether a compelling state purpose supports the 
government action).337  
Therefore, this Article seeks to explore a more holistic approach, one 
that moves beyond critiquing discrete big data programs and instead 
stresses the commonalities between these various government programs. 
Looking at the harms of these programs collectively may provide the 
theoretical vista for conceptualizing how big data blacklisting is, in itself, 
a substantive due process violation. This is a complex undertaking, and 
future scholarship on this subject will explore the analytical framework 
of substantive due process in the context of the mass harms of big data 
blacklisting. But for the present, this Article is necessarily more 
descriptive—delineating the general contours of big data blacklisting as 
a technique of governance and suggesting that procedural due process 
may be inadequate to remedy big data blacklisting harms.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article asks whether procedural and substantive due process 
protections, as currently constructed, fail to address big data blacklisting 
harms. Big data blacklisting impacts fundamental constitutional rights 
when digital data is flagged as “suspicious” through big data tools and 
data tracking systems, and when individuals are categorized as “guilty 
until proven innocent” through big data-generated inferential guilt. It 
contends that big data blacklisting harms are not just procedural in 
nature—that the government has failed to offer proper procedures for 
remediation of these harms—but that big data dataveillance systems may 
obstruct fundamental liberty interests. It poses the following question: 
whether freedom from big data blacklisting harms should be protected as 
a cognizable fundamental liberty interest under substantive due process. 
In seeking to critique the constitutional impact of multiple big data 
programs collectively, this Article attempts to identify a constitutionally 
                                                                                                                     
Powers, YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) (“The distinctive aspect of modern ‘substantive due 
process’ . . . is its treatment of natural liberty as inviolate, even as against prospective and general 
laws passed by the legislature and enforced by means of impeccable procedures.”). 
 336. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 1, at 508 (“If the state seeks to take an individual’s liberty or 
property, it must generally ensure that he has notice of the basis for its action and a meaningful 
opportunity to defend himself.”).  
 337. Fallon, supra note 67, at 314 (“[G]overnment intrusions on so-called ‘fundamental’ 
rights are subject to ‘strict’ or exacting scrutiny, a test sometimes formulated as inquiring whether 
a burden is necessary to promote a ‘compelling state interest.’” (citing, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 
112 S. Ct. 1780, 1804 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678, 684–91 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973))). 
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cognizable harm across the multiple big data blacklisting programs 
discussed. Additionally, because the traditional legal framework guiding 
due process analysis is often equipped to handle discrete harms that stem 
from individualized government programs and specific administrative 
procedures, it may seem counterintuitive to analyze multiple programs 
collectively. This Article argues that because big data blacklisting harms 
have not been legally conceptualized, yet implicate a mass societal harm 
that threatens fundamental liberty interests, a legal framework that 
possesses the capacity to analyze and address these new harms 
collectively is needed. I reserve for future scholarship a more detailed 
treatment of individual big data blacklisting programs and the application 
of the due process inquiry more specifically. 
Finally, more empirical evidence, programmatic transparency, and 
evaluative protocols are needed to assess the sources and specific nature 
of the unreliability of nonclassified and classified or semi-classified 
government big data programs. To more fully assess the nature of big 
data blacklisting, further interrogation is necessary to examine the multi-
dimensional and significant long-term consequences of the government’s 
increasing reliance on big data policymaking and algorithmic 
intelligence, and the impact of this reliance on procedural and substantive 
due process rights.338 Core liberties may be obstructed in a way that is 
rapidly evolving and systemic, however, nearly impossible to detect 
because of the opacity and complexity of big data technologies, and the 
administrative systems that support them. Consequently, fundamental 
liberty interests are implicated by big data blacklisting in a way that now 
necessitates an evolution of the due process jurisprudence. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 338. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13, at 27 (“In constructing 
strategies for technological due process in scoring contexts, it is helpful to consider the sort of 
notice individuals are owed when governmental systems make adverse decisions about them. 
Under the Due Process Clause, notice must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to inform individuals of 
the government’s claims against them.”) (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 
(2002)); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1276–77 (“[A]gencies must 
recognize and address the ways in which automation undermines the procedural safeguards 
typically attached to individual adjudications and rulemaking under the Due Process Clauses of 
the Constitution and federal and state law[.]”) (citation omitted); Fairfield & Luna, supra note 36, 
at 994 (arguing in favor of stronger procedural protections for criminal defendants by recognizing 
the potential exonerating value of Big Data evidence: “What is needed now is . . . an understanding 
of Big Data and mass government surveillance, and an evaluation of the legal consequences for 
the actually innocent”); Manta & Robertson, supra note 62, at 1 (arguing that “courts should 
incorporate elements of substantive due process by applying a unified due process standard that 
requires a higher evidentiary burden—and real evidence of national security benefits—before the 
government may curtail significant individual liberties”). 
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Appendix A. Examples of U.S. Citizens Alleging Erroneous Work 
Opportunity Deprivation from Database Screening 
 
  







Car dealership employee341 E-Verify search resulted in an erroneous 
TNC apparently because the U.S. State 
Department never notified SSA  of his 
change in status. His employer fired him 
and his electricity was shut off because 
he could not pay the bill. Allegedly paid 
over $400 to secure a new naturalization 
certificate to clear his name in databases 







Employee at a 
telecommunications 
company345 
Employment termination due to an E-
Verify TNC error that could not be 
resolved. After three months of 
unemployment, she attained a new job 
with “significantly lower pay.” Later, 
with the aid of the National Immigration 
Law Center, she discovered that the 
problem occurred allegedly because “the 
employer had placed two spaces after 
[her] last name” when entering the 
information into the E-Verify database 
screening system.346
John Doe I347 U.S. Citizen, 
Resident of 
Ohio348 
Former captain in the U.S. 
Navy with thirty-four years 
of service349 
Despite history of high military security 
clearance, data error required a two-
month investigation with the assistance 




                                                                                                                     
 339. David Bier, Why Everyone Should Fear E-Verify, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2012, 11:57 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bier/why-everyone-should-fear-e-verify_b_161005 
7.html. 
 340. Id. 
 341. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., HOW ERRORS IN E-VERIFY DATABASES IMPACT U.S. 
CITIZENS AND LAWFULLY PRESENT IMMIGRANTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.nilc.org/
document.html?id=337. 
 342. Id. 
 343. ACLU, PROVE YOURSELF TO WORK: THE 10 BIG PROBLEMS WITH E-VERIFY (2013), 
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/everify_white_paper.pdf. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. 
 347. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 341, at 1, 4 n.2.  
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 1. 
 350. Id. 
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Jane Doe I351 U.S. Citizen, 
Resident of 
Florida352 
Employee at a national 
department store chain353
Erroneous E-Verify TNC notice 
resulted because employee “recently 
remarried and changed her name.” 
SSA office informed her that the 
matter was resolved; however, when 
she returned to work, she was 
informed that DHS had directed the 
employer to terminate her 
employment because employer 
claimed that the database screening 
result indicated that “[she was] 








Construction worker357 Employee fired twice from 
construction jobs because “E-Verify 
failed to confirm his employment 
eligibility.” He was “only able to 
return to work after a community 
advocate took on his case and 
located the source of the E-Verify 
TNC error.”358
Ken Nagel359 U.S. Citizen, 
Resident of 
Arizona360 
Restaurant Owner361 Mr. Nagel expressed his concerns 
over the accuracy of E-Verify after 
he hired one of his daughters, a 
native-born U.S. citizen, and upon 
entering her personally identifiable 
data into the database screening 
system, received an erroneous E-
Verify TNC regarding her 
employment eligibility.362 





Potential employer rescinded job 
offer because employee received an 
erroneous E-Verify TNC, and the 
nursing home allegedly decided to 
hire someone else.366 
Jane Doe III367 U.S. Citizen, 
Resident of 
California368 
Searching for a job using 
an employment services 
Informed by an employment agency 
that there were several employers 
that would be interested in hiring 
                                                                                                                     
 351. Id. at 2. 
 352. Id.  
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id.  
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id.  
 360. Id. 
 361. Id.  
 362. Id.  
 363. Id.  
 364. Id.  
 365. Id.  
 366. Id.  
 367. Id.  
 368. Id.  
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company369 her based on her extensive work 
history. However, employment 
agency later informed her that she 
could not obtain a job because she 
received an erroneous TNC from E-
Verify.370
John Doe II371 U.S. Citizen, 
Resident of 
Colorado372 
Engineer373 Employee received an erroneous 
TNC and staffing agency revoked 
job until SSA corrected the error. 
After SSA corrected the error, the 
agency could not locate comparable 
work for the employee.374 
Appendix B. Examples of U.S. Citizens Claiming Erroneous Voter List 
Purging Based Upon Database Screening 
  
State Criteria Used to 
Purge Voters 
General Results of 
Database 
Screening
Examples of Wrongly Purged 
U.S. Citizens 
Virginia375 State election 
officials attempted 





showed up in a 
database as 
registered in more 
than one state.376  
Of the 38,870 
names that were 
purged, many were 
later found to be 
the result of 
database matching 
errors. Many voters 




recently than the 
other state. Thus, 
voters were eligible 
to vote in Virginia. 
377  
“County registrars say hundreds 
of eligible voters have been 
removed and complain they’ve 
been strong-armed into moving 
ahead too quickly.” Lawrence 
Haake III, the Chesterfield 
County registrar and a 
Republican, joined an affidavit 
filed by Democrats against the 
Republican Attorney General, 
calling the list of 2200 names he 
had received to be purged 











more than 10,000 
The violation was 




The government removed a 
Republican congressional 
candidate in the upcoming 
election, his wife, and his 
                                                                                                                     
 369. Id.  
 370. Id.  
 371. Id. at 3. 
 372. Id.  
 373. Id.  
 374. Id.  
 375. Roth, supra note 252. 
 376. Id.  
 377. Id.  
 378. Id.  
 379. PÉREZ, supra note 251, at 21. 
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residents from voter 




primary in March 
2008. The purge 
included recent 
voters in November 
2007 elections. The 
state attempted to 
correct purge errors 
before the 
election.381
daughter from the voter rolls.382  
Georgia383 Muscogee County, 
Georgia, attempted 
to purge 700 voters 
from voter rolls 
because election 
officials believed 
purged voters were 
convicted felons.384 
Over a third of the 
700 voters called to 
report that the letter 
they received 
informing them of 
the purge was a 
mistake.385  
A computer program that 
matched names of felons to 
names of voters generated the 
list used by the county; 
however, the program used no 
other identifying information 
other than the database name to 
support conclusion that voter 
was a felon.386
 
Appendix C. Examples of U.S. Citizens Claiming Erroneous 
Detention, Deportation and Database Screening 
 
Name Citizenship Detention or Deportation Consequences 
Mark Lyttle387 U.S. citizen born in 
North Carolina388 
Lyttle screened through S-
COMM database twice. 
Lyttle filed lawsuit against 
DHS for wrongful 
deportation.389 
Deported to Mexico. Removed from the United 
States in December of 
2008. Crossed border on foot with only three 
dollars, and wandered 
through Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Guatemala for 125 days 
before being referred to a U.S. consular office that 
confirmed his citizenship. 
Lyttle does not speak Spanish.390
                                                                                                                     
 380. Id.  
 381. Id.  
 382. Id.  
 383. Id. at 22.  
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, ACLU (Apr. 25, 
2013, 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-its-
own-citizens. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
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U.S. citizen born in 
Texas392 
Arrested for shoplifting in 
Houston, and she gave a 
false name that matched the 
name of an undocumented 
immigrant in the database. 
Although her fingerprints 
did not match the false 
name, the government still 
deported her.393  
Deported to Colombia. 
Turner was fifteen years 
old at the time of the 
deportation; lived in 
Colombia for almost one 
year before her 
grandmother located her. 





U.S. Citizen, resident 
of California396  
S-COMM led ICE to 




had failed once before to 
recognize his citizenship, 
mistakenly deporting him 
to Mexico in 1996. His 
records were not 
corrected.”398  
Police arrested and charged 
Montejano with shoplifting. 
He had purchased $600 worth 
of merchandise but forgot to 
pay for candy his children 
had eaten while in the store 
and a $10 bottle of perfume 
that had failed to scan at the 
register.399 A Los Angeles 
county judge ordered his 
release from jail, but he 
remained detained due to an 
immigration hold.400 Detained 
for four days in jail by orders 
of ICE until his citizenship 
was proven.401 He was 
released from prison after the 
ACLU delivered his passport 
and birth certificate to ICE. 
402  
 
                                                                                                                     
 391. Julianne Hing, How Did 15-Year-Old Jakadrien Turner, a U.S. Citizen, Get Deported?, 
COLORLINES (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/how_did_
jakadrien_turner_a_us_citizen_get_deported.html. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. E.J. Tamara, Secure Communities Program Arrested U.S. Citizens: Report, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/15/secure-communities-
us-citizens-arrested_n_1150877.html; see also Keith Rushing, SCOMM Leads to Jailing of 
Another U.S. Citizen, RIGHTS WORKING GRP. (Dec. 16, 2011, 11:58 AM), 
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/scomm-leads-jailing-another-us-citizen. 
 396. Tamara, supra note 395. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/us/measures-to-capture-illegal-aliens-nab-citizens
.html.  
 399. Tamara, supra note 395. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Simone Wilson, Antonio Montejano, U.S. Citizen and L.A. Dad, Detained for Days on 
‘Immigration Hold,’ LA WEEKLY (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.laweekly.com/informer/2011/
12/14/antonio-montejano-us-citizen-and-la-dad-detained-for-days-on-immigration-hold.  
 402. Tamara, supra note 395. 
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Makowski became a 
naturalized U.S. 
citizen at the age of 
one, but the 
government did not 
update his 
immigration records, 
according to his 
lawyer.404 
Born in India and 
adopted by a U.S. 
family when he was 
four months old.405 
 
S-COMM led ICE to 





identified . . . as an illegal 
immigrant and authorities 
ordered him detained in a 
maximum-security 
prison.”407 Detained for 
two months. “Mr. 
Makowski was accepted 
into the U.S. Marines in 
2004 and underwent an 
FBI check as part of that 
process. Nevertheless, 
DHS never updated its 
records to reflect Mr. 
Makowski’s 
citizenship.”408 
Filed lawsuit against the 
FBI and DHS.409  
Jose 
Velazquez410 
U.S. citizen411 S-COMM led ICE to 
believe Velasquez was an 
undocumented immigrant. 
412
U.S. citizen wrongfully 
detained in Los Angeles 
County.413  
Romy Campos414 Dual citizen of 
United States and 
Spain, born in 
Florida415  
Once entered the U.S. on 
her Spanish passport, 
which triggered the S-
COMM database.416  
Nineteen-year-old college 
student who spent four 
days in jail on an 
immigration detainer 
following a misdemeanor 
charge.417  
 
                                                                                                                     
 403. U.S. Citizen Sues FBI and DHS for Unlawful Imprisonment Due to Secure Communities, 
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (July 3, 2012), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/press_releases/ 
us-citizen-sues-fbi-and-dhs-unlawful-imprisonment-due-secure-communities [hereinafter U.S. 
Citizen Sues]. 
 404. Id.  
 405. Brian Bennett, Citizen Sues over Imprisonment Under Fingerprint-Sharing Program, 
L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/06/nation/la-na-secure-
communities-20120706. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. U.S. Citizen Sues, supra note 403. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Velasquez was reportedly going to join Antonio Montejano in a lawsuit over their 
incarceration. See Tamara, supra note 395.  
 411. Id. 
 412. See id. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Preston, supra note 398. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
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Andres Robles418 U.S. citizen that 
acquired derived 
citizenship when his 
father, a U.S. citizen, 




contained errors, possibly 
leading to a positive match 
in S-COMM.420  
Deported to Mexico in 
2011.421 Received a letter 
in Mexico stating that the 
U.S. government would 
issue a certificate of 
citizenship; however, was 
required to retrieve letter 
in person in the United 
States. He was unable to 
do so because he was 
erroneously deported. 
Filed lawsuit against 
DHS.422
Geraldo 
Gonzales, Jr. 423 
U.S. citizen born in 
California424 
When arrested in 
December 2012 on a drug 
charge, arrest report 
erroneously stated he was 
born in Mexico.425  
When he became eligible 
for release from drug 
charge, he attempted to 
post bail and learned that 
he was on an immigration 
hold by ICE, despite 
ICE’s lack of authority to 
detain U.S. citizens.426  
Hector Veloz427 Born in Mexico, but 
U.S. citizen by birth: 
father is a U.S. 
citizen who was 
serving in Vietnam, 
mother went to stay 
at family’s house in 
Mexico while she 
was pregnant.428  
Arrested in 2006 when he 
bought a stolen car. ICE 
did not believe he was a 
U.S. citizen because his 
parents had never obtained 
a certificate of citizenship 
for him.429  
After nine months in jail, 
an Arizona judge declared 
that he was a U.S. citizen 
and ordered release. ICE 
appealed the ruling, and 
he remained in jail for 






                                                                                                                     
 418. Alex Nowrasthe, Commentary: Mistaken Deportation of Texas Teen Highlights the 
Rigid, Incompetent Immigration Bureaucracy, HOUS. CHRON. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/01/commentary-mistaken-deportation-of-texas-teen-high 
lights-the-rigid-incompetent-immigration-bureaucracy/.  
 419. Id.  
 420. See Jacqueline Stevens, How ICE Deported Another U.S. Citizen, Andres Robles Still 
in Mexico, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG (July 27, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://stateswithoutnations 
.blogspot.com/2011/07/how-ice-deported-another-us-citizen.html. 
 421. Nowrasthe, supra note 418. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Aura Bogado, Why Is This US-Born Citizen Being Detained by ICE?, NATION (June 21, 
2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174921/why-us-born-citizen-being-detained-
ice#.  
 424. Id.  
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Tyche Hendricks, U.S. Citizens Wrongly Detained, Deported by ICE, SF GATE (July 
27, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/U-S-citizens-wrongly-detained-
deported-by-ICE-3291041.php.  
 428. Id.  
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
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U.S. citizen, derived 
citizenship in 2002 
from his mother’s 
naturalization432  
No explanation for the 
mistaken detention.433 
ICE came to Ocampo’s 
home and arrested him, 
reportedly based on 
database hit after he had 
been convicted of other 
crimes. Despite providing 
necessary documentation 
to prove citizenship, 
including his mother’s 
naturalization 
information, detained for 
several days.434 
 
Appendix D. Examples of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Immigrants 
Challenging Erroneous Placement on No Fly List Based upon Digital 
Watchlisting and Database Screening435 
 
  
Name State Occupation Consequences
Ibraheim (Abe) 
Mashal436 
Illinois437 U.S. Marine 
Corps veteran 
and owner of a 
dog training 
business438
Lost business clients due to his inability to 
fly. Unable to travel to family events such 
as his sister-in-law’s graduation and to 
fundraising events for the nonprofit 
organization that he founded. 439 
Amayan Latif440 Georgia441 U.S. Marine 
Corps veteran442 
Lost his veteran disability benefits because 





Oregon445 N/A Could not fly to visit his daughter who is studying in Dubai and cannot fly to 
accompany his mother on a hajj 
pilgrimage.446
                                                                                                                     
 431. See Jacqueline Stevens, ICE Kidnaps Another US Citizen in Springfield, Illinois, 
STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG (June 21, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot 
.com/2012/06/ice-kidnaps-another-us-citizen-in.html.  
 432. Id.  
 433. See id. 
 434. Id. 
 435. In 2012, according to a spokesman for the TSC, the number of U.S. citizens on the list 
remains “‘very small’ and relatively stable, at 500.” Stone, supra note 297. 
 436. Federal Court Sides with ACLU in No Fly List Lawsuit, ACLU (Aug. 29, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/federal-court-sides-aclu-no-fly-list-lawsuit. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. See id. 
 440. Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298 (D. Or. 2013). 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
 443. Id. Latif was unable to return to the United States and remained in Egypt for six months 
because the government did not allow him to board a flight home. Id. In October 2010, the 
Egyptian government granted him a “one-time waiver” to fly to the United States. Id. 
 444. Id. at 1298–99. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
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Illinois448 U.S. Army 
veteran449 
Job offer rescinded because he was unable 
to fly home for required medical 
examination. Prevented from returning 
home after visiting his wife’s family in 
Columbia. Eventually resorted to traveling 
for twelve days through Mexico to 





U.S. Air Force 
veteran453 
Returned to United States by taking a series 
of five flights from Ireland to Mexico, and 
then by crossing the U.S. border on foot. 
Unable to see wife since May 2010 because 




Georgia456 N/A Unable to travel to Yemen in 2012 to attend 
brother’s funeral and cannot visit his 
extended family.457 
Amir Meshal458 Minnesota459 N/A Could not visit his mother and extended 
family in Egypt. Allegedly offered the 
opportunity to serve as an informant in 




California462 N/A Five-day boat trip from St. Thomas to 
Miami and a four-day train ride from 
Miami to Los Angeles to be present for the 
birth of his second child. Cannot travel to 
perform hajj pilgrimage.463 
                                                                                                                     
 447. Id. at 1299. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 1299–1300. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id at 1301. 
 456. Id. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Id. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 
 463. Id. 
74
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/5









Questioned in Egypt for six weeks before 
receiving a one-time waiver to return home. 
The Virginia native reported that the FBI 
asked him to be an informant in the Muslim 
American community.467 
Kevin Iraniha468 California469 Student with a 
masters degree in 
International 
Law470 
Prevented from flying home from his 
graduate studies in Costa Rica. Forced to 
travel to Mexico and cross into the United 
States by land. After questioning, the FBI 
allegedly asked him to be an informant.471 
Muhammed 
Tanvir472 
New York473 Lawful 
permanent 
resident474 
Allegedly offered the opportunity to serve 
as an informant in exchange for removal 




                                                                                                                     
 464. Ian Shapira, U.S. Citizen on No-Fly List Discusses Being Stranded in Egypt and Talks 
with FBI, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/07/26/AR2010072605404.html. 
 465. Id. 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Shirin Sadeghi, U.S. Citizen Put on No-Fly List to Pressure Him into Becoming FBI 
Informant, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shirin-
sadeghi/kevin-iraniha-no-fly-list_b_1579208.html. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. 
 472. Hunter Stuart, Muhammed Tanvir, New York Man, Put on No-Fly List After Refusing to 
Spy for FBI, Lawsuit Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/10/04/fbi-spy-no-fly-list-lawsuit-muslims-_n_4045791.html. 
 473. Id. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. 
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